Fletcher v. Peck

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Fletcher v. Peck is a difficult decision to read, for much of Marshall’s discussion turns on principles of real estate law and on the complexities of appellate and civil procedure. Thus, for example, he makes several early references to “demurrers,” which are responses to a complaint filed in a lawsuit that ask a court to dismiss the suit on the ground that even if the facts alleged in the complaint were true, the suit has no legal basis. The parties to the suit are not simply the “plaintiff” and the “defendant” but the “plaintiff (and defendant) in error,” which simply means that the parties are bringing the case on appeal. Marshall carefully examines these procedural matters before getting to the heart of the case.

In essence, the Court deplores the corruption behind the Georgia legislature’s sale of the land. That corruption, however, was the fault of neither of the parties to the case. The contracts for the sale of the land under the original law have to be accepted as valid because the motives of the Georgia legislature are irrelevant. Peck purchased the land from Georgia in good faith, and Fletcher bought the land from Peck, also in good faith. Fletcher was thus a “bona fide purchaser,” a legal term that refers to a person who has purchased an asset, such as real estate, and is innocent of any fact that would cast doubt on the seller’s right to have sold it in good faith. The Court notes that any legislature can undo laws passed by a former legislature, but the legislature cannot invalidate any actions other parties took under the law during the time the law was valid.

In Fletcher v. Peck, the Court held that the sale of the land was a contract. Under Article I, section 10, of the U.S. Constitution, a state cannot pass an ex post facto law—that is, a retroactive law, or a law that punishes a person now for having done something that was legal at the time he or she did it. Nor can states pass laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” meaning that once a valid contract is made, the state cannot interfere with it or pass laws that would render the contract invalid. Thus, Marshall concludes: “this rescinding act would have the effect of an ex post facto law. It forfeits the estate of Fletcher for a crime not committed by himself, but by those from whom he purchased.” Marshall continues by saying that the Court’s opinion is unanimous:

The estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, the State of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institutions or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void.