Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Syllabus

The case includes a syllabus of the facts and background events of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. The syllabus discusses the writ of error that brings the case before the Court, and it quotes Roane's Hunter v. Martin decision that “so much of the 25th section of the act of Congress to establish the judicial courts of the United States, as extends the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to this Court, is not in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States.” The syllabus chronicles the original state court case launched in April 1791 by Hunter against Martin and lists the facts of the case.

Story's Opinion of the Court

In Story's Martin v. Hunter's Lessee decision, he cites Roane's Hunter v. Martin decision and acknowledges the current case's complexity. He notes that the “people of the United States,” not the states, created the Constitution. The American people have the right to regulate and limit state powers under the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution reveals that states remain sovereign except in those areas where the framers granted power to the federal government. Story then argues that although the federal government can claim only powers granted under the Constitution, such powers should be reasonably, not strictly, construed. The framers created a Constitution “to endure through a long lapse of ages,” with Congress creating laws to carry out constitutional goals during changing social circumstances. Article III of the Constitution created the Supreme Court, empowered Congress to create lower federal courts, and set jurisdictional boundaries for all federal courts. The American people empower these courts through the Constitution to act on individuals and states.

Article III obligates Congress to establish federal courts and staff them with tenured judges. Without a federal court system, the federal government cannot carry out its powers expressly granted under the Constitution, such as punishing crimes committed against the United States or hearing court cases that involved two states. In order to create such a federal court system, Congress must be allowed to vest the entire judicial power of the federal government in the federal court system. Story admits that what types of inferior courts Congress is obligated to create is a difficult question. He maintains that under Article III, Congress must create some inferior federal courts, which could serve as courts of original jurisdiction for cases involving constitutional issues, federal laws, treaties, and so on. The Constitution does not specify what courts to create, however, so Congress has discretion to organize such tribunals.

Story makes these general points before turning to a more specific discussion of which cases the Supreme Court wields jurisdiction over. He insists that under Article III, Section 2, the Supreme Court wields appellate jurisdiction over “all cases” involving the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties. Story also admits, however, that the Constitution grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction over “controversies to which the United States shall be a party.” Thus the Constitution gives the Supreme Court automatic jurisdiction over national security issues, such as federal laws and treaties, but leaves it to Congress to grant the Supreme Court the power to hear other types of cases that might become more important to national interests over time. Story, making this distinction, nevertheless remarks that, regardless of whether federal court jurisdiction is granted by the Constitution or Congress, such authority can be wielded only by federal, not state, courts. Furthermore, it could be fully exercised where such federal jurisdiction existed.

Story argues that as the Constitution does not specifically limit the ability of Congress to grant the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, Congress could give the Court appellate jurisdiction over types of cases not specifically mentioned by the Constitution, including cases originating in state courts. Ultimately, “it is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction.” Congress has merely to show that the Supreme Court deserves such power through clear and necessary implication. Story reasons that if federal appellate power applied only to federal but not to state courts, then the federal courts could not carry out their enumerated jurisdiction over cases specifically mentioned in the Constitution. If Congress creates no lower federal courts, then, of course, the Supreme Court would have appellate powers over state courts—in those areas in which the Constitution grants the Supreme Court such power.

Story states that the framers had foreseen that cases involving national issues might arise in state courts. They accordingly created Article VI of the Constitution, which made the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties “the supreme law of the land” and which bound state court judges to obey these precedents. Without the supremacy clause, state courts could rule on matters such as issuing paper money or ex post facto laws, which are powers the Constitution grants to Congress. For these reasons, federal appellate power must obviously extend to state court cases.

Story dismisses criticisms that federal appellate jurisdiction over state cases goes against the spirit of the Constitution and impairs states' rights. He points to the fact that the Constitution limits state power in a number of areas, such as senatorial and presidential elections. State judges are likewise bound by their oaths and the supremacy clause to uphold the Constitution and federal law. In response to the charge that federal courts might abuse their power to revise federal or state law, Story responds, “From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere—wherever it may be vested, it is susceptible of abuse.” It is simply a matter of common and legal sense that appellate courts, rather than courts of original jurisdiction, should be given the right to make final determinations in such cases.

Story likewise argues that giving the federal courts appellate powers was perfectly in keeping with American constitutional traditions. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had been granted the power to establish courts to rule on state prizes cases. Far from being a threat to states' rights, such a measure had been seen as important to public safety and national security. The fact that the Constitution, which called for a much stronger central government, gives jurisdiction of prizes cases to the federal courts reveals that federal appellate jurisdiction is in no way an aberration in American jurisprudence.

In addition to arguments that federal appellate powers are unconstitutional, Story contends with charges that such a system is impractical as well. After all, state judges would obey their oaths and uphold federal laws in all state cases, regardless of federal jurisdiction. In a similar fashion, Congress could remove all cases from state to federal court before they were decided at the local level. Story admits that state and federal judges are quite similar in “learning, integrity, and wisdom.” The American people, however, have created the Constitution to remove important cases involving national security from local concerns and temptations, so that they might be resolved by an impartial tribunal that spoke for the entire country. Federal appellate jurisdiction would likewise help regulate and harmonize state court cases into a manageable whole. A federal appeals process would also protect the rights of defendants who have lost cases in state court and who would otherwise have no rights to appeal.

Story admits that the Constitution does not grant any branch of the federal government the express power to remove cases from state to federal court. Yet such a power is a necessary one for the federal courts to have. Since the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from exercising such power, it could allow federal courts to take charge of state court cases at any time in their deliberations. Under these circumstances, it is perfectly appropriate for a federal court to review a state court case on a writ of error. Furthermore, if state courts could refuse to obey such writs, the resulting legal chaos would undermine private rights and public safety. Under these circumstances, Section 25 of the federal Judiciary Act of 1789 is “supported by the letter and spirit of the Constitution.”

Although Story grounds his defense of federal appellate power on the Constitution, he shows how his decision also makes sense within a historical context. He points out as a matter of historical fact that both Federalists and Antifederalists had widely accepted the fact that if the Constitution were adopted, it would grant appellate jurisdiction over state courts. In a similar fashion, many of these same Federalists had gone on to serve in the first Congress and had helped to create the Judiciary Act of 1789. Until the current controversy, Story notes, state courts had frequently acquiesced when the Supreme Court reviewed their cases. Such compliance places federal appellate power “upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken without delivering over the subject to perpetual and irremediable doubts.”

Having defended the rights of federal courts to hear state court cases on appeal, Story examines whether the current controversy is admissible in federal court under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Stripped of jargon, Section 25 states that state supreme court decisions involving federal law, constitutional issues, or federal treaties could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error. As the Court of Appeals of Virginia declares the Supreme Court's decision in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee null and void, the matter pertains perfectly to the guidelines for a writ of error under Section 25, in which state supreme court cases that conflict with federal law could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Despite this reasoning, Story argues that without the Virginia court's unwillingness to support a Supreme Court decision, Martin still has a right to have his case heard in federal court. Story admits that the case is centered on private land claims contested by two Virginia citizens under state law. Martin's inheritance of Virginia land hinges upon the validity of Denny Martin's land claims under the provisions of the Treaty of Paris and the Jay Treaty. The Court of Appeals of Virginia has considered Martin's land claims in relation to these treaties and rejects them to rule in favor of Hunter. Thus the Supreme Court could examine the same legal matters and rule in favor of Martin.

Story addresses the question of whether the Supreme Court could rule only on the matter of federal treaties and not state land titles. He responds that Congress grants the Supreme Court the latitude to consider all legal points in a case when determining its outcome. The Supreme Court could also consider the Jay Treaty, which upholds Loyalist property rights, even though the treaty was created only after the Hunter-Fairfax controversy had begun. Story asserts that when Congress had ratified the Jay Treaty, it became the supreme law of the land and attached itself to the case.

Story rejects the remaining arguments against Martin's land claims as merely procedural rather than substantive in nature. The writ of error has been properly submitted from the Virginia Court of Errors and is therefore eligible for review by the Supreme Court. Even though the judge issuing the writ of error had not followed procedure and taken a bond, the writ had still been issued in good faith and was therefore valid. Story also declines to discuss whether the Supreme Court could legally issue a writ of mandamus to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, as the matter is not necessary to solve the case before the Court. He thus concludes his opinion by stating that it is “the opinion of the whole Court that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, rendered on the mandate in this cause, be reversed, and the judgment of the District Court, held at Winchester, be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.”

Johnson's Separate Opinion

In his concurring opinion, commenting on Story's decision not to determine whether federal courts could issue writs of mandamus to state courts, Johnson states that the Supreme Court is correspondingly supreme in its jurisdiction but not willing to force the state courts to comply with its decisions. Against such a backdrop, Johnson stresses his agreement with Story's decision, “but not altogether in the reasoning or opinion of my brother who delivered it.” Given the natural tendency for people to disagree, Johnson feels a need to defend his concurring opinion on his own terms.

Johnson states that he wishes to express his opinion because he views “this question as one of the most momentous importance; as one which may affect, in its consequences, the permanence of the American Union.” The important case represents a collision between federal law and the laws of one of the most powerful states in the Union. Johnson warns that the federal government must carry out its constitutionally mandated powers or cease to exist. On the other hand, to subordinate states' rights to federal interests would destroy democratic government in the United States. Although Johnson admires the Old Dominion's pluck for standing up for its rights, he criticizes the Court of Appeals of Virginia for taking such an extreme position. The legal issue at hand is whether the Virginia court was bound to obey the Supreme Court's orders in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee. Instead, Roane and his colleagues had provoked a larger confrontation over whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over state courts at all.

Johnson maintains that Virginia's stance is an alarming one. If Virginia could challenge Supreme Court decisions, then what could prevent other states from doing likewise? Although the Supreme Court is no more infallible than the state courts, it has a tradition of respect and comity with the state courts. Furthermore, the Supreme Court represents every state in the Union, and thus one can count on it to be more magnanimous, especially when the public interest is at stake.

To further promote the Supreme Court's virtue, Johnson places the blame for the current conflict squarely on the shoulders of the Virginia courts. He points out that Roane had acquiesced to the Supreme Court's writ of error in the original case of Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee. The Supreme Court, therefore, believes that the Court of Appeals of Virginia would abide by its decision, regardless of how the Court rules. Had Roane refused to comply with the initial writ and raised jurisdictional issues at that point, at least the Supreme Court would have been aware of the crisis. In such a case, the Supreme Court would not have issued an order demanding that the Court of Appeals of Virginia comply with the Fairfax decision, and the matter could have been amicably disposed of in Circuit Court. The Founders anticipated that state courts might refuse to obey federal court decisions and thus gave the federal courts the power to compel them to obey. But federal courts could use their discretion in exercising such powers with the hope that comity might prevent crises between the states and federal government. By its rash actions, writes Johnson, Virginia forces the Supreme Court to take an adversarial position; the current situation is Virginia's own making.

Johnson begins his opinion by stating that, even though the Treaty of Paris and the Jay Treaty were not central to the land issues in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, any part of the case that calls into question the validity of these treaties makes it applicable for review by the Supreme Court. To declare that the Supreme Court could rule on the constitutionality of federal treaties but on not state land laws would mean that the Court could render a hypothetical decision in favor of Martin but have no means of actually enforcing it. Rather than view the case as a matter of federal courts invading the state legal system, Johnson argues that the more proper question is “whether the State tribunals can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction in any of the cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends.” Johnson admits that the Constitution is vague as to whether state courts could act in federal matters if Congress or the federal courts refused to do so. Johnson sees the Constitution as a “tripartite” contract between the people, states, and federal government. Under the terms of this agreement, each party surrenders part of its powers for the greater good, particularly the right to mete out justice. In addition, the framers wrote the Constitution in plain, obvious language that empowers the federal government to fully exercise the powers it was given in the areas assigned to it by the Constitution, such as the power to extend federal appellate power over certain controversies or cases. Just as individuals could renounce rights created for their benefit, so too state courts could act in areas in which Congress declines to rule. The federal government could curtail such state power at any time.

The central issue remains whether federal courts have appellate power over state courts, and Johnson admits that he is undecided. He merely maintains that Congress at no point makes a systematic attempt to turn the state courts into inferior courts. Certainly, instances in which states could arrest, imprison, and sentence to death foreign ministers or federal agents exist. Under such circumstances, federal appellate power is necessary to preserve both justice and the Union. If ever the federal courts should attempt to force state courts to adopt federal law, then the Supreme Court would have to deal with the matter as it arose. For the moment, however, it is merely enough to show that Congress has the authority to grant the Supreme Court the right to hear state supreme court cases in civil matters. Congress, in passing the Judiciary Act of 1789, had allowed states to retain a great deal of their sovereignty. Congress gave plaintiffs and defendants the ability to appeal their cases in both state and federal court. State court justices can issue or decline to issue writs of error to the Supreme Court. Cases under review require that both parties appear and explain their legal arguments to a new court. In any event, the Supreme Court seeks to hear cases based on their merits and not on whether they come from a state or federal court in particular.

Johnson reasons that Congress gave federal courts appellate power over state cases for two specific reasons. First, a federal appeals process gives defendants full rights to appeal their state cases, a right they would not enjoy under state law. Second, even if Congress grants federal courts original jurisdiction over all cases involving the Constitution and federal laws, there would still be entire classes of cases beyond the reach of federal jurisdiction. This could lead to endless confusion throughout the nation as different courts handed down conflicting decisions, with no means of regulation.

Johnson concludes that he believes his opinions are not merely constitutional but also practical and that they jeopardize neither the survival of the Union nor the dignity of the states. State courts should not fear federal power simply because the federal courts provide another forum to hear their cases. With a common commitment to justice and comity, the federal and state courts could work together, without the need for compulsion, which neither Congress nor the Supreme Court attempts nor plans to attempt.