Allen Dulles: Television Interview on the Soviets’ Intentions

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Allen Dulles appeared on American television at a crucial moment in the Soviet Union's history. Nikita Khrushchev had emerged as a powerful leader after a power struggle following the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Although Khrushchev had served as one of Stalin's loyal lieutenants, he recognized the need for reform, especially to dispel the climate of paranoia and panic that Stalin's purges had provoked. At a Communist Party congress in 1956, Khrushchev delivered an unusually frank speech, revealing Stalin's persecution and murder of party members. The ramifications of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin were incalculable, as it led to the disaffection of many loyal Communists who could no longer support Stalinism and coincided with efforts in Eastern Europe to relax the grip of Soviet-backed regimes that were restricting free speech and basic human rights. It was natural, then, that Dulles—charged with monitoring and curbing Soviet efforts to subvert democratic movements and spread Communism abroad—should be questioned about Khrushchev's motives and the impact his anti-Stalin policies would have on the CIA and other American governmental institutions.

In this interview, conducted on June 14, 1956, by Representative Harold C. Ostertag of New York, a deeply skeptical Dulles warns against taking Khrushchev's words at face value. He expresses the belief that the Soviet premier was attacking Stalin as a ploy, in the hope of convincing the Soviet people that the new regime was renouncing tyranny. But Soviet intentions had not changed; that is, world dominance remained the Communist program. Dulles shows far less concern for Stalin's crimes, simply acknowledging the leader's murderous behavior.

Asked about the Soviet public's response to Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin, Dulles states that there was much confusion because Stalin had been built up for so long as the country's savior-hero. Radically changing public opinion in Russia would be difficult, Dulles points out, given that the current leaders were part of the apparatus that Stalin himself had instituted. But perhaps they could at least alleviate some of the public anxiety that Stalin's brutal methods had stimulated. The Soviet government would function better, Dulles suggests, if the tension Stalin had introduced into the system dissipated.

On the topic of Soviet intentions in Berlin, Dulles reiterates his disbelief that the Russians would leave Germany or allow the United States to dominate it. He alludes to the Berlin blockade (June 24, 1948, to May 11, 1949), when the Russians attempted to close off access to the western sectors of the city. In response, the United States and its allies successfully organized an airlift that supplied the beleaguered city. Considered the first crisis of the cold war, the airlift had shown Western determination and ingenuity, revealing capability far greater than the Soviets had supposed in their drive to get the United States and its allies out of Germany. Although the Soviets could prevent the unification of Germany, they also realized, Dulles points out, that the Americans could not be forced out of the country.

Dulles's worries about the recovery of West Germany had disappeared; in the next few years its thriving economy was to have no counterpart in East Germany, where the Soviets were still trying to develop an alternative to the Western model. West Germany, Dulles points out, was a great example of what a free people could do. Asked about China's plans for attacking Formosa (Taiwan), Dulles hesitates to make a prediction. He observes the potentially hostile situation, given the Chinese threat to invade the island that had become the home of the National Revolutionary Army, which had fled the mainland when the Communists took power. Similarly, Dulles could not say what would happen in South Korea, although he notes that the failure to unify the country during the Korean War perhaps meant that the North Koreans and their allies (the Chinese) would not make another effort to invade the South.

On the subject of nuclear arms, Dulles refuses to be specific, except to state his doubt that the Russians had an overall lead in the development of intercontinental missiles. It was not his expertise or his responsibility, however, to make such comparisons. Dulles seeks to dispel any notions that U.S. intelligence, the military, and other government organizations were in disarray. He notes his belief that these institutions were coordinating their efforts and would avoid another Pearl Harbor, when the United States had succumbed to a surprise Japanese attack, which initiated American engagement in World War II.