Allen Dulles: “The Present Situation in Germany”

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Allen Dulles's remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations occurred in the uncertain period right after the end of World War II. Germany was an occupied country, with authority divided among the Soviet Union and its allies, the United States, France, and Great Britain. Tensions were high in Berlin, situated in East Germany, where Soviet power prevailed. The beginnings of the cold war, in which the United States and the Soviet Union would compete as superpowers seeking to extend their international influence, centered on Berlin, a flashpoint that could conceivably set off another world war. At issue was the way in which Europe would recover and the roles the United States and the Soviet Union would play in that recovery. For the Soviets, gaining control of Berlin was crucial, since it would serve as a focal point in their effort to dominate Eastern Europe by holding a large part of Germany, the country that had decimated the Soviet Union and had started two world wars. The Soviets were determined never to put their own land at such risk again. But the United States interpreted Soviet aggressiveness in Eastern Europe not merely as a defensive strategy but as part of Communism's quest for world domination. The United States prided itself on defending what it called the “free world.” Like the Soviet Union, the United States had its spies and intelligence-gathering agencies—the CIA in particular, which Allen Dulles was shaping to comport with U.S. desires to block or contain Soviet influence everywhere.

In early December 1945, Dulles was preparing to retire from government service after having spent the war in the OSS in close contact with the German resistance to Hitler and then as an observer of the early stages of German postwar reconstruction. In this context, he delivered remarks as part of an off-the-record meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations. Dulles begins by describing the current situation: Germany was still suffering the ravages of defeat, with a barely functioning economy. Security seemed a lesser problem. No underground group existed that could challenge the occupying authorities. Finding competent people to reconstruct the country was proving difficult, however, since many anti-Nazis qualified to work had been out of the country and were out of touch with the current conditions. As a result, at least some former Nazi Party members had to be employed.

Dulles provides examples of the complexities of evaluating Nazi Party membership. Some had joined merely to obtain or retain their employment; others might have served the Nazi government in some capacity but were not party members and did not believe in Nazi ideology. Yet certain regulations restricted such people from employment in postwar Germany. Nazi control had spread through so many institutions—such as banking—that it proved difficult to find anyone who had not collaborated with the regime in some way, no matter how minor or even unintentional. Many Germans had been deprived of basic rights, Dulles admits, but with seventy thousand arrests, it became impossible to devote much time to individual cases. The first priority was to ensure the occupation of Germany, Dulles notes, expressing his reluctance to criticize the American occupation.

Dividing Germany into four zones—as per agreements between America and its allies—had proved unworkable, in Dulles's opinion, especially since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to cede power to the other. Even worse, U.S. occupation authorities worried over American reactions to any efforts to rebuild Germany, which might be characterized as restoring the country's power to make war. And the Soviet Union's intentions were unclear: Did it mean to rebuild its part of Germany or allow it to remain in ruins? In Dulles's view, the Soviets were not making much progress in transforming East Germany using Communist methods.

Dulles takes a dim view of Soviet behavior, noting how Soviet troops had pillaged the country and were behaving like “thugs.” The Soviets had reneged on their promises at the meeting in Yalta, Ukraine, to respect the rights of Germans and other defeated nations. Consequently, Dulles believes that much bitterness could result from the Soviet occupation of East Germany. To Dulles, the problems in Germany seem nearly insurmountable because of the scant trust between the occupying Americans and the German populace still angry over the war's outcome. Women had had no influential roles in Nazi Germany, and it was difficult to see how they could be enlisted to ameliorate the country's plight. Similarly, serious doubts had been raised about involving the churches in political reform. And yet Dulles could not see how Europe could prosper if Germany did not become a productive state.

Dulles holds out some hope that perhaps local government could be revived in Germany and the elements behind the attempt on Hitler's life in 1944 could be relied upon to lead reconstruction efforts. But as long as the Soviet Union occupied part of Germany, Dulles could see no way to reestablish a central government. Thus, at the time of these remarks, Dulles was well on his way to formulating a policy that would result in a separate West Germany, in which the United States would be free to reconstitute a German democracy without the interference of the Soviet Union.