Franklin D. Roosevelt: “Pearl Harbor” Speech

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Franklin D. Roosevelt dictated virtually every word of his short address—fewer than 500 words—to his secretary, Grace Tully. The phrasing of the next-to-last sentence alone was suggested by another, his close adviser Harry Hopkins.

Roosevelt begins his address to the joint session of Congress by baldly and solemnly stating that the United States has been attacked “suddenly and deliberately” by the “Empire of Japan.” By citing the day, December 7, as “yesterday,” the president captures the immediacy and shock of the event. Further, it was not just an attack on the United States but a “day which will live in infamy.” In other words, what the Japanese did was far worse than just one country attacking another; Roosevelt's words imply that this was a disgraceful deed that could never be forgotten. Roosevelt also pointedly uses the term “Empire of Japan,” wording that was sure to remind Congress and the American people of Japan's occupation of vast areas of China and its militaristic campaigns throughout the 1930s. Implicitly, the “United States,” a republic, was by definition different in kind from the expansionist Japanese state, which was ruled not only by a military-dominated government but also by an emperor.

To open the second paragraph, Roosevelt notes that the United States had itself made no attacks and had been conducting talks with the Japanese government and its emperor about how to maintain peace in the Pacific. In fact, the Japanese had themselves asked for such talks, as though their intentions had been honorable and peaceful. Even as Japanese airplanes were bombing the naval base at Pearl Harbor on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, where much of the U.S. fleet was based, their ambassador delivered to the U.S. government a “formal reply to a recent American message.” By using the word “conversation,” Roosevelt suggests that he had understood the two nations to have a rather relaxed, ongoing relationship far removed from plans for war. No suggestion is made in this paragraph that the United States had perceived a need to be on high alert or that the negotiations had been tense. Indeed, “maintenance of the peace”—the phrase that Roosevelt uses—suggests routine, standard procedures.

The United States was not, in other words, prepared for hostilities. The fact that the Japanese ambassador had delivered a “formal reply” further suggests that he and his associates were acting with the full backing of their government. Moreover, the contact between the two countries was at the highest level—between the U.S. secretary of state and the Japanese ambassador, who not only spoke for his government but also was in contact, Roosevelt implies, with the emperor himself. Roosevelt concedes that the formal reply indicated that further talks “seemed useless,” but the American government was given no inkling that the Japanese were about to wage war. This point is important because it establishes that the United States not only was unprepared for the Pearl Harbor attack in particular but also was given no warning that Japan intended to wage war.

Roosevelt's congressional audience surely had in mind the events that had precipitated World War I—the assassination of the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand, Germany's declaration of war on Russia, and Britain's and France's coming to the aid of their ally Russia by declaring war on Germany. The United States had not entered World War I until a series of provocative military actions were carried out by the Germans. In other words, an ominous buildup to war had occurred, with actions taken that clearly presaged open conflict. The Japanese, on the other hand, had brought about conflict much differently—barely signaling dissatisfaction with the United States while scheming to bomb its Pacific Fleet. The fact that the Japanese might have had valid cause for concern about the U.S. presence in the Pacific—the point of the talks in Washington—no longer mattered, since any sympathy for Japanese apprehensions about U.S. power was obliterated by Japan's sneak attack.

In the third paragraph, Roosevelt wholly dismisses the notion that the Japanese attack should be considered impulsive or irrational. In order to attack Hawaii—a long distance from Japan—deliberate planning would have been conducted for “many days or even weeks,” Roosevelt observes. In other words, the Japanese were preparing to attack the United States even as they conducted talks in Washington emphasizing their desire for peace. No other conclusion, then, can be drawn than that Japan had practiced an elaborate deception.

Only after establishing Japanese culpability and exonerating the United States of any hostile intentions does Roosevelt turn to the damage the enemy had wrought. Without providing specifics, Roosevelt indicates that the losses had been devastating. He refers to “severe damage to American naval and military forces” in Hawaii, the loss of many American lives, and yet more damage to American ships torpedoed between Hawaii and San Francisco. Thus, the attack had been directed both at the major source of American naval strength and at the nation's command of the Pacific.

Without a word about his personal response to this devastation—other than his comment on the “day which will live in infamy”—Roosevelt enters the fourth paragraph to deliver a series of stark reports of coincidental Japanese attacks on Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines, Wake Island, and Midway. The mention of all of these attacks of “last night” evokes the enormous scale of the Japanese Empire's advances. Roosevelt seemingly felt that with such obvious evidence of aggression, no further comment was necessary; in presenting the attacks in rapid succession, the president emphasizes how quickly and brutally Japan had moved not only against the United States but also against the British in Hong Kong, for example. In effect, Japan, like Germany, was understood to be attempting to conquer vast stretches of the world; regardless, Roosevelt chose merely to report the dramatic events rather than editorialize about them.

Not until the sixth paragraph does Roosevelt summarize the implications of these attacks: “Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area.” Even here the president's words are measured, as he confines his comment to what Japan had done in the “Pacific area.” Rather than indulging in any sort of broad characterization or speculating further on Japan's motives, Roosevelt states that the “facts . . . speak for themselves” while also noting, “The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.” In effect, Roosevelt felt no need to explain the causes of the war, since he was confident that Americans understood the threat represented by the attack. Saying more, perhaps, would have only detracted from the stark outrage of the moment. Roosevelt also felt no need to say anything specific about the need to retaliate, other than to state in the seventh paragraph that as commander in chief he would take the appropriate measures for the defense of his country.

Echoing his first paragraph, Roosevelt sums up in a one-sentence paragraph the national anger over this unprecedented attack and the notion that it could never be erased from history: “But always will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us.” December 7, 1941, in other words, was already a historic moment, even a defining event, in the country's history. Roosevelt's use of the future tense—“always will”—reflected a certainty and sense of command that reinforced his role as commander in chief.

Having made the case so powerfully, leaving no doubt about Japanese perfidy, Roosevelt finally resorts to language of morality in the ninth paragraph, speaking of the American people's “righteous might,” which would lead to “absolute victory.” This conviction he balances against his awareness that it may take considerable time—“no matter how long”—to “overcome this premeditated invasion.” Coupled with his assurance that the Japanese attack will never be forgotten is Roosevelt's vow that through the will of Congress and the American people, this “form of treachery shall never again endanger us.” Thus, he is calling for a war that perhaps will not end all wars—as Woodrow Wilson once promised in regard to World War I—but will nevertheless result in greater security for the American people and in greater certainty that no power like Japan will ever rise again to threaten Americans so directly.

Roosevelt's call for “absolute victory” presaged the later decision to firebomb Tokyo and other Japanese cities and to wage war until the Japanese surrendered unconditionally. This grand call for total victory also helps to explain why the United States decided to drop the atomic bombs on Japan: The goal of the nation was not merely to deprive Japan of the ability to defeat the United States but furthermore to ensure that Japan—as well as any other country, with the example set—would never even suppose it could vanquish the United States.

In paragraph 10, having situated the Japanese attack in the context of history, viewing it as one of his country's defining moments, Roosevelt returns to the present, cautioning his audience that the people and the property of the United States are in “grave danger.” In other words, an attack on Hawaii—which was at the time a territory, not a state—had ramifications for the continental United States; the Japanese had effectively brought war onto American soil. Later, serious concern would be expressed about the Japanese ability to bomb West Coast cities. This atmosphere of dread that for the first time the continental United States itself might be bombed would lead, in part, to the incarceration of Japanese Americans in internment camps. Agents of the government mistakenly thought that this segment of the population—the majority of which were citizens—might have posed a subversive threat to the homeland.

In the next paragraph the president expresses confidence in the U.S. armed forces and in the “unbounding determination of our people,” in wording that now submerges his own role into the will of all Americans facing a common threat. His addition of the phrase “so help us God” is reminiscent of his oath of office; the phrase would become a sort of uniting pledge given by any Americans who feel that their might is on the side of right.

In his closing paragraph, Roosevelt asks Congress for a declaration of war, saying that the war between the United States and the Japanese Empire is already in progress, as of December 7. Calling Japan's attack “dastardly,” Roosevelt revisits the beginning of his speech, declaring the “infamy” of this day in history. Dastardly, a rather old-fashioned word that would now seem melodramatic or even faintly comic, meant something quite different to Roosevelt's audience: that what the Japanese had done, attacking without warning and giving the United States no opportunity to defend itself, was both treacherous and cowardly. The word gave the president and his country the high moral ground and the impetus to fight a war against a despicable, immoral, and devious enemy. To wage war against Japan would be not merely to conquer a foe but furthermore to reassert decency and to destroy evil itself.