Fugitive Slave Act of 1793

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 engaged some of the most important issues in antebellum America, including proper constitutional interpretation and the relationship of the states to the federal government. Crucial to understanding the Fugitive Slave Act are its sources of law, which included not just the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution but also the law of master and slave and natural law theories of justice. In addition, the application of the Fugitive Slave Act changed during the six decades of its operation, in part because the circumstances under which it operated evolved considerably during that time.

Congress struggled with constitutional ambiguity when it considered the subject of fugitives from justice or labor, and it took several drafts before the final version of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was enacted. Sections 1 and 2 of the statute dealt with the rendition of fugitives from justice. Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution commanded that those charged with “Treason, Felony, or other Crime” who fled from one state to another “shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.” Section 1 required that the executive authority’s demand for a fugitive be accompanied by a copy of an indictment or an affidavit sworn before a magistrate charging the fugitive with having committed treason, felony, or another crime. Once this legal requirement was met, it became the “the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested.” States were required to hold fugitives for at least six months before agents arrived to collect them, and expenses were to be borne by the state making the demand for the fugitive. Section 2 of the act gave state agents the right to transport fugitives across state lines back to the state or territory from which they had fled. This section also made forcible rescue of such fugitives a federal crime, punishable by a fine of up to $500 and one year in prison.

Sections 3 and 4 of the statute dealt with the rendition of fugitive slaves. The process differed significantly from the rendition of fugitives from justice. Section 3 authorized slaveholders or their agents to seize fugitive slaves without an arrest warrant and take them before any federal judge residing in the state or any state magistrate. The section further empowered state and federal judges to issue warrants for removal across state lines “upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit” that the man, woman, or child seized was in fact a fugitive slave. Section 4 gave relief to slaveholders who faced difficulties in retrieving their fugitive slaves. Any person “knowingly and willingly” obstructing or hindering a slaveholder from arresting a fugitive, or rescuing a fugitive in a slaveholder’s custody, or harboring or concealing a fugitive slave after notice was given of the fugitive’s status was liable to the slaveholder in an action of debt for $500.

This act, on the whole, represented a conservative interpretation of Article IV, Section 2, by Congress. Although the law spelled out the duties of state officers, it preserved the role of the states in rendering fugitives. The differences between the treatment of fugitives from justice and fugitive slaves, however, is instructive. In the case of fugitives from justice, rendition was public, conducted by the executive authority of the state. The governor was expected to deploy law enforcement officers, make an arrest, and hold a fugitive in the state’s jails. There was to be no judicial hearing, nor did the statute provide any federal relief if a state governor refused to extradite a fugitive. This proved problematic, and somewhat ironic, when Governor Salmon P. Chase of Ohio refused in 1859 to extradite a free black man named Willis Lago to Kentucky to face an indictment for the crime of “helping a slave escape.” The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case in Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) and ruled that the federal government lacked the constitutional authority to compel states to render fugitives from justice.

In contrast, the rendition of fugitive slaves was a private affair. Arresting the fugitive was up to the slaveholder, as was the transport of the slave back to the slaveholder’s state. The state bore no responsibility for these processes. Likewise, the rescue of a fugitive from justice was treated as a crime, whereas the rescue of a fugitive slave would be remedied in civil court. The extension of federal jurisdiction to fugitive slave cases also meant that the slaveholder’s private property right in a slave was, in essence, constitutionalized. Nonetheless, there were limits to this constitutional right. Given that the Fugitive Slave Act did not specify what constituted proof of fugitive status for either federal or state judges, state legislatures could and did define it. The Fugitive Slave Act did, however, specify that a judge alone could issue a certificate of removal without the aid of a jury. This was in potential conflict with the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that no person be deprived of liberty without due process of law and the Sixth Amendment’s promise of a jury trial in all criminal cases. Abolitionists would later raise this complaint in numerous cases, but they were continually rebuffed by state and federal judges.