Fugitive Slave Act of 1850

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 is best understood first as a document that sought to close the loopholes that allowed northerners and northern state governments to evade the intent of the Constitution’s clause calling for the recovery of fugitives from labor who crossed state lines. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 had proved insufficient as a way to secure the recovery of fugitives, in large part because of the efforts of several northern states to block its effective implementation through the passage of “personal liberty laws.” Further, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 specified federal judges as the only federal officials who could determine the status of an accused fugitive, but the new law extended this authority to federal commissioners and allowed federal courts to appoint more such commissioners.

Sections 1–3

The first section of the law identifies commissioners who have been appointed by any act of Congress or by the circuit courts and who have the same authority as a justice of the peace or local magistrate to arrest, imprison, or grant bail to offenders of the law. The section then states that these commissioners were to have the authority to exercise the powers granted to them under the present act. The second section essentially extends these same powers to commissioners in the Territories, that is, to those regions that were under the control of the U.S. government but had not yet been admitted to the Union as states. Commissioners in the Territories were to be appointed by the circuit court that had jurisdiction in them. The third section simply authorizes the circuit courts to expand the number of commissioners needed to “reclaim fugitives from labor.” In essence, the first three sections of the act established a class of legal authorities outside the courts that would have the power to enforce the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act.

Sections 4 and 5

With Section 4, the act turns to the specific powers and duties of this body of commissioners. Section 4 specifies that commissioners were to have “concurrent jurisdiction” with the circuit courts and superior courts. Concurrent jurisdiction refers to a situation in which two (or more) courts at different levels—a state court and federal court, for example—have jurisdiction over a case. By granting the commissioners concurrent jurisdiction, the act in essence removed the legalities of capturing fugitive slaves from the courts and placed it in the hands of commissioners. These commissioners were then granted the authority to capture runaway slaves and return them to their states.

Section 5 introduces some of the more draconian provisions of the act. It begins by stating that “it shall be the duty of all marshals and deputy marshals to obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under the provisions of this act.” The section goes on to specify that if a marshal failed to execute a claim by a slave owner (a “claimant”), he could be fined. Making matters worse for the marshal, it is decreed that if a slave held in the marshal’s custody escaped, whether through the collusion of the marshal or not, the marshal could be held liable by the claimant for the full value of the slave. To help the marshal avoid these legal difficulties in carrying out his duties, he had the authority to appoint persons to assist him in capturing runaway slaves. Further, marshals had the authority to “summon and call to their aid … bystanders,” that is, to invoke the principle of posse comitatus. This is a Latin term used in the law; its literal meaning is “power of the county,” and it refers to the authority of a marshal to appoint a temporary police force. Compare the posse of Western movies and television shows, where groups of townsmen, with the sanction of the marshal, temporarily gather to hunt down criminals. Making matters worse for ordinary citizens was that the law specifies that “all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law.” In effect, everyone became a potential slave catcher.

Sections 6 and 7

Section 6 continues with the somewhat tortuous legislative language of the preceding sections, but buried within the language is a key component of the law: Accused fugitive slaves are stripped of their civil rights. The section first states that a presumed slave owner may “pursue and reclaim” a “person held to service or labor.” He could do so either by procuring a warrant or by “seizing and arresting such fugitive, where the same can be done without process” (that is, without court proceedings). The seized person could then be taken to court, where the issue was to be decided in a “summary” manner. All the claimant had to do was assert by affidavit the identity of the fugitive and claim that the fugitive was in fact a slave; no other legal proof was required. The claimant, or his agent, was authorized to “use such reasonable force and restraint as may be necessary,” giving slave catchers a free hand in hunting down and subduing a runaway. Further, the act states that “in no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence.” In effect, the accused was rendered unable to defend him or herself. Of course, this provision would have struck fear into the hearts of free blacks: All a claimant had to do was seize a black and claim runaway status, and the authorities had to support the claim.

Section 7 made it illegal to aid a runaway slave, stating that any person who obstructed, hindered, or prevented a claimant from arresting a fugitive, rescued a fugitive, helped a fugitive escape from the claimant, or harbored or concealed a fugitive could be fined or imprisoned, or both. Additionally, such a person could be required to pay restitution to the claimant.

Sections 8–10

Section 8 created an interesting conflict of interest. In the wake of Prigg v. Pennsylvania there was a vast increase in the number of government officials involved in the process of capture, determination of status, and return of fugitives. These commissioners were to be paid by fees resulting from the cases over which they presided. If a commissioner ruled that the accused was not the slave in question, he would be paid five dollars. But if the commissioner determined that the accused was in fact the slave in question and issued a certificate authorizing removal of the slave, he would receive ten dollars, supposedly because of the increased administrative costs of such a decision. Thus, the law provided a financial incentive for commissioners to side with claimants rather than with the accused, who might very well have been free blacks not allowed to prove their status. Section 8 also provided for payment to any individuals who assisted a marshal in capturing and holding a runaway slave. Again, this provision of the law had the effect of turning a class of persons into bounty hunters with a potential incentive to seize any black person, claim runaway status, and collect a fee.

Section 9 turned to the issue of transporting a runaway back to another state. This provision states that if the possibility existed that the claimant would meet with any interference (that is, that rescue attempts would be made), the marshal was obligated to provide protection until he had passed over the state’s border; indeed, it was the marshal’s duty to return the slave to his or her home state. The Fugitive Slave Act concludes with Section 10, which established procedures for a claimant to appeal to a court in his home state when a slave escaped. The court was then required to create a record that the claimant could use in another state to enforce his claim to the slave. Section 10, though, states that such a record was not required, so that a claimant who did not have a record from his home state was still entitled to enforce his claim in another state.