George F. Kennan: “Long Telegram”

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

The telegram consists of an outline of the basic features of the USSR's postwar outlook; the background of this view; a description of how it informed Soviet policy, both officially and unofficially; and what the United States could learn from this outlook and then adapt to its own policy. Kennan carefully and explicitly lays out the USSR's understanding of its position in the world, characterizing the Soviet state as believing itself encircled and besieged by capitalist states naturally combative and inclined toward hostility against the USSR. He describes this mindset as a descendant of the old czarist state's paranoid exposition of great Russian nationalism, an “us vs. them” mentality meant to keep foreign influences out of Russian culture, to keep Russians themselves within the borders to avoid contact with the outside world, and to pursue the expansion of the Russian empire's borders as an antidote. Effectively, Kennan argues that the conviction of the Soviet Union's leadership is the same as that of the old czarist state, in that its own preservation is its most important focus; if that preservation is to be effective against both internal and external foes, the best defense is a good offense.

A major point Kennan emphasizes is the idea that Marxism is a “fig leaf” for this mindset, that the Soviet leadership may believe in Marxist ideology, but it is merely useful as a way of distinguishing the Stalinist regime's goals from that of its czarist predecessors. He notes that it was no mistake that Marxism took hold in Russia—an unlikely origin source for the worldwide revolution, in Marx's eyes, for its lack of a large industrial base and its small number of industrial workers. To Kennan, the point was that Marxism espoused a similar hatred of democracy and capitalism and held a similar belief that the Western world was out to destroy any semblance of Russian success. Just as the czars and their civil servants believed the world was out to undermine their religiously dictated autocracy with ideas on democracy and capitalism, so did Vladimir Lenin and Stalin and their underlings believe the world was out to undermine their goal of a worldwide Marxist industrial workers' revolution with ideas on democracy and capitalism. Kennan appropriately sees the Soviets as more insidious and dangerous than the czarist autocracy, because they used Marx's writings to justify the expansion of their influence around the world through any means necessary. Spying, sabotage, corruption, lying, murder, and mayhem were all justified in the advance of the worldwide revolution and would persuade people in other countries to be in league with the Soviet world plan, where the czarist state simply hoped to be left alone.

The USSR was thus convinced that its standing on the world stage must be preserved at all costs, preferably at the expense of the United States. Kennan makes clear that this is the position of the inner circle of the Communist Party and does not reflect that of the Russian people, who are ruled by a tyrant. Kennan further points out that the party's viewpoint that there can be no peaceful coexistence between Communist and capitalist countries is simply false, subtly suggesting to his superiors that they could consider a foreign policy that emphasized coexistence, rather than combativeness, once conditions improved.

The first step toward an intelligent policy with regard to the Soviets, Kennan says, is to take the time and effort necessary to understand the nation and the Communist movement. Only then, he argues, could policy be profitably formed. Kennan notes that the Soviet state and Stalin in particular were impervious to logic or argument. The dictator was far too insecure and suspicious to be persuaded; he would assume that he was being lied to and act accordingly. Kennan points out that however resistant Stalin was to argumentation, he was highly sensitive to judicious application of force. Rather than relying on goodwill gestures or efforts to engage the Soviet leadership in negotiations, Kennan proposes engagement with the Soviet Union where it tried to expand and threaten vital American interests—with sufficient force to compel the USSR to withdraw. Here was the essence of the policy soon to be referred to as “containment,” a worldwide political game of “whack-a-mole” where American institutions and principles should be ready to confront Communist advances wherever they happened to pop up. Kennan argues that subtlety would not work and that it would be better to react too strongly than too weakly.

Kennan would later complain that American officialdom did not understand the principle behind containment, that being prepared on any given scene for a show of force—especially militarily—to stem the tide of Communism was very different from using that force in a proactive as opposed to a reactive manner. Kennan's beliefs about the U.S. ability to face off and defeat Soviet aggression were more proactive on domestic terms. He makes the point that the public needed to be educated about the Soviets, thereby lessening irrational fears of the unknown. Moreover, America should look to its own society and try to solve its internal problems—economic inequality and racism, most prominently—lest Stalin's regime profit by comparison. Kennan urges the development and promulgation of a constructive vision of the future world. It is not enough, he says, to encourage people to emulate American ways; rather, the United States should articulate a vision that other peoples could achieve by cooperation, under U.S. guidance. Last, Kennan warns against adopting Soviet tactics in confronting the Soviet Union. The show trials and employment purges of the Red Scare represent the kind of mirroring of Soviet actions in the name of confronting the USSR that Kennan warns against in the telegram.