George H. W. Bush: Address to Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Unlike Reagan, his predecessor in the White House, Bush did not have a reputation as a “Great Communicator.” He was instead known for using words carelessly, ineffectively, and even strangely; his critics called these mistakes “Bushisms.” But as he begins his speech on September 11, 1990, President Bush uses one of the most effective techniques of Reagan, the Great Communicator: He presents a complex and controversial issue in human terms. After providing the basic facts that had produced the crisis in the Persian Gulf, Bush concentrates in the first four paragraphs of his address on the American men and women in uniform who are meeting this international challenge. He praises their courage, dedication, and skill, and he emphasizes the sacrifices they are making, along with those of their family members, while serving far from home with little advance notice. Bush then puts a human face on the thousands of Americans in uniform in the Persian Gulf as he uses the example of Private Wade Merritt. Whatever differences there might be about how to deal with Iraqi aggression, the president emphasizes that Americans should unite in thanking U.S. troops and supporting them.

The president then builds on this theme of national unity as he tries to capitalize on public approval of the steps he had taken in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He asks the American people to support not only the troops but also their mission. He also links the defense of U.S. interests and values abroad to economic strength at home. Polls showed that his approval rating had increased by twelve points, to 75 percent, after his decision to commit U.S. military forces to the Persian Gulf. Yet the same polls revealed that only a small plurality of Americans (49 to 41 percent) thought the current situation justified the United States' going to war. Most Americans (69 percent) also believed an economic recession would occur during the next year, and a smaller but still substantial majority (53 percent) disapproved of the president's handling of the economy. By linking the crisis in the Persian Gulf and the health of the economy, the president hoped to use his public approval on the first issue to increase support for his proposals to deal with the second issue.

In the next section of his address (paragraphs 5 to 8), Bush asserts that what is happening in the Persian Gulf could shape world affairs for years to come. He states four clear goals: the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's government, the preservation of security in the Persian Gulf, and the protection of American lives. These objectives, which he had announced a month earlier when sending U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, rested on principles that most nations had accepted. International peace and stability could not exist if aggressors could conquer other nations. The members of the UN Security Council had agreed, when a month earlier they had condemned Iraq's invasion, demanded the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait, and imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Hussein had not just invaded one nation or challenged regional stability; he had violated principles that put him at odds with the world community. “It is Iraq against the world,” the president asserts.

This crisis occurred at what Bush calls “a unique and extraordinary moment,” since the end of the cold war less than a year earlier had fundamentally altered international relations. Bush had met during the past week with Soviet President Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finland, and he quotes the statement that he and Gorbachev had released denouncing Iraqi aggression. In previous international crises, the Soviet Union and the United States had usually been on opposite sides. U.S.–Soviet cooperation allowed the United Nations to act quickly to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and to impose economic sanctions. “No longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression,” Bush declares.

The president looks forward to the achievement of a fifth major objective in addition to the four he previously listed. The last goal, a new world order, is the most ambitious of all. Bush describes it as a sweeping and even revolutionary change in how nations dealt with each other. The new world order would allow nations to live in security and harmony, free from the danger of terror, and to cooperate to ensure international justice and respect for the rights of the weak. These are lofty and laudable goals, even if the president is more than a little optimistic in declaring that humanity is on the verge of achieving what had eluded a hundred previous generations. Yet Bush is justified in believing that the end of Soviet-American antagonism, which had shaped international affairs since the mid-1940s, creates new opportunities for nations to work together through the United Nations to prevent aggression or to punish nations that attack their neighbors.

Whether the nations of the world would achieve a new world order, according to the president, depends on how they respond to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Bush believes that he is confronting the first post–cold war crisis, or what he calls “the first test of our mettle.” If the United States and the United Nations were resolute and successful in meeting this challenge, the new world order would not just be an inspiring dream but an emerging reality.

At stake are not just matters of principle, the president explains, but also important interests that require U.S. leadership. In the next section of his speech (paragraphs 9 to 14), Bush explains that the occupation of Kuwait enabled Saddam Hussein to double his control of the world's proven oil reserves. U.S. troops are in Saudi Arabia to prevent Hussein from doubling his share yet again, from the 20 percent then under his control to 40 percent, if Iraq were to occupy Saudi Arabia. At a time when the United States imported almost half the petroleum that it used each day, the president asserts, “We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless.”

Also critical was the release of Americans and other foreign nationals being detained in Iraq and Kuwait. Approximately three thousand foreign nationals, at least one-quarter of them Americans, were being held in Iraq against their will. Many were workers; a few were tourists who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Hussein referred to them as “guests,” an outrageous description of civilians whom he planned to use as human shields to prevent attacks against Iraqi military forces. For the Bush administration and the American people, the detention of these foreign nationals evoked memories of the Iran hostage crisis a decade earlier. In his speech, Bush denounces the cruelty of seizing hostages and the cynicism of calling them “guests.” He quotes the British prime minister Margaret Thatcher to make clear that he will not negotiate or pay blackmail to secure the hostages' freedom. Eventually, Iraq yielded to international pressure and released the last of the hostages in December 1990, four months after their detention.

While pledging that the United States would cooperate with other nations, Bush asserts the need for U.S. leadership. He energetically sought international partners who would join with the United States in forcing an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Eventually, he secured about three dozen coalition partners. Forging such a broad coalition required considerable diplomatic skill, and the president was pleased that armed forces from nations on four continents were helping to defend Saudi Arabia. While he welcomed these international partners, the president declares here, “There is no substitute for American leadership.” He thought it essential to demonstrate that even though the cold war was over, the United States would take strong, quick, and effective action to meet international threats. “Let no one doubt American credibility and reliability,” he proclaims. “Let no one doubt our staying power.”

Bush then turns to the substantial costs of the international effort in the Persian Gulf (paragraphs 15 to 20). Although the United States was the leading member of the coalition, it lacked the financial resources to pay the costs of its increasing military commitment in the Persian Gulf. Coalition partners that did not supply troops, such as Germany and Japan, provided financial assistance. So did several Arab countries, as Bush explains in his speech. Saudi Arabia and other petroleum-rich countries were expanding oil production, a critical step because the United States depended so heavily on oil imports. Gas prices had risen after Iraqi forces struck Kuwait. The president's discussion of these steps to increase oil supplies helped ease popular fears about shortages at the pump in the event of a major war in the Middle East.

The United States would achieve its goals, whatever the cost, in the Persian Gulf, the president tells his audience. Bush states that sanctions would have sufficient time to work. While he does not explicitly threaten military action, his assertion that he would “continue to review all options with our allies” makes clear that he would use force, if necessary. The president briefly mentions that a major U.S. role in the Persian Gulf is not a new development. Ten years earlier, in what became known as the “Carter Doctrine,” President Jimmy Carter had declared that any attempt by an outside force to control the Persian Gulf was a threat to vital U.S. interests that would require a response including military force, if necessary. Bush does not refer to this statement by his Democratic predecessor but instead reiterates his own basic policy in simple, straightforward language. “We will not let this aggression stand,” he says. “That's not a threat, that's not a boast, that's just the way it's going to be.”

In the last major section of his address (paragraphs 21 to 30), the president concentrates on the domestic economy and its effects on U.S. strength abroad. The focus of his discussion is the annual budget deficit, which had risen to a projected $232 billion. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation required a reduction in that projected shortfall, or there would be mandatory cuts—“the ax of sequester”—in most major programs, including defense at a time when such reductions could have a devastating effect. Time was running short for the White House and Congress to agree to a budget compromise, since the new fiscal year, which started on October 1, was less than three weeks away. Although the president refers to his “friends in Congress,” his goal was to use the Persian Gulf crisis and public frustration about what he calls “endless battles” over financial matters to pressure the Democratic leadership on Capitol Hill to make concessions. It was now “time to produce” a long-term program that “truly solved the deficit problem” and to devise solutions to other economic problems, such as dependence on foreign oil. The president appeals for a resolution of differences at this moment of “adversity and challenge.”

In the final paragraph, Bush ends as he began by framing the issues of security and the economy in human terms. Americans were saying painful goodbyes to serve in Operation Desert Shield. Soviets and Americans, “old adversaries,” were making “common cause.” Surely, he thinks, Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, could do the same.