Intolerable Acts

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

The Intolerable Acts were four separate pieces of legislation adopted by Parliament in 1774 in response to the Boston Tea Party: the Boston Port Act, the Massachusetts Government Act, the Administration of Justice Act, and the Quartering Act. Even though it was not related to the events in Boston, a fifth act, the Quebec Act, was often included by American radicals as one of the Intolerable Acts.

The Boston Port Act

The only one of the Intolerable Acts intended solely as a punitive measure, the Boston Port Act was designed “to discontinue, in such manner, and for such time … the landing and discharging, lading or shipping, of goods, wares, and merchandise, at the town, and within the harbour, of Boston.” It also declares “that the officers of his Majesty's customs should be forthwith removed” from Boston to Salem. The preamble justifies the legislation in breathless, hyperbolic terms, claiming that “dangerous commotions and insurrections” had been “fomented and raised … by divers ill-affected persons, to the subversion of his Majesty's government, and to the utter destruction of the publick peace.” Boston is described as being wracked with “commotions and insurrections” that led to the seizure and destruction of “certain valuable cargoes of teas, being the property of the East India Company.” Consequently, “the present condition of the said town and harbour” has rendered it a place where “the commerce of his Majesty's subjects cannot be safely carried on … nor the customs payable to his Majesty duly collected.”

The act's opening clause is its most sweeping. Effective June 1, 1774, it prohibits anyone in or around Boston Harbor from loading or unloading “any goods, wares, or merchandise whatsoever” to or from any ship. Nothing could be transported by water out of the city to the colony's trading partners, whether in another country or another part of Massachusetts Bay, nor could any stores enter the port. (The act did not apply to overland transportation through the narrow neck that connects Boston with the mainland.) The penalty, however, for anyone who wanted to test Parliament's newfound mettle hardly matched the overheated rhetoric in the preamble. Instead of a threat of criminal prosecution, which one might reasonably expect for those who dared to destroy Boston's public peace, the sanction was strikingly equitable, providing an economic punishment for an economic infraction. Intrepid captains who sought to flaunt the ban did so “upon pain of the forfeiture” of whatever goods they were attempting to move, along with the “boat, lighter, ship, or vessel or other bottom into which the same shall be taken, and of the guns, ammunition, tackle, furniture, and stores, in or belonging to the same.”

Clauses II and III of the bill also attempt to curtail any effort to skirt the act's prohibition. The latter section raises the stakes somewhat for Bostonians who participated in an attempt to ship merchandise or assisted someone who did. It sets the penalty for getting caught at triple the value of the goods seized, together with the forfeiture of “the vessels and boats, and all the horses, cattle, and carriages, whatsoever made use of in the shipping, unshipping, landing, removing, carriage, or conveyance of any of the aforesaid goods, wares, and merchandise.” Clause III moves from the shore to ships, placing any vessel “seen hovering” in Boston Harbor “or within one league from the said bay” on notice that a Royal Navy ship of war or a customs officer had new authority to “compel such ship or vessel to depart to some other port or harbour.” Although government officials were vaguely empowered to “use such force for that purpose as shall be found necessary,” potential malefactors were given notice that they had six hours to clear out of Boston, facing forfeiture of their vessels and everything on board if they failed to heed the directive.

The act's fourth provision lists those items excluded from the ban on shipping. Military stores and anything intended for official purposes were exempt, as was “any fuel or victual brought coastwise from any part of the continent of America, for the necessary use and sustenance of the inhabitants of the said town of Boston” so long as the ships were furnished with a pass and searched by customs officials for contraband. Also, any vessels that arrived in Boston Harbor by May 31, the day before the act's effective date, could engage in their intended business provided that they left within a fortnight.

Clause V addresses the potential for corruption among those enforcing the legislation. It explicitly removes the prosecution of “all seizures, penalties, and forfeitures, inflicted by this act” from the jurisdiction of any provincial officer who might feel inclined to go soft on defendants who also happened to be their neighbors. It gives the responsibility to almost everyone else with a title or access to someone with one, including

any admiral, chief commander, or commissioned officer, of his Majesty's fleet, or ships of war, or by the officers of his Majesty's customs, or some of them, or by some other person deputed or authorised, by warrant from the lord high treasurer, or the commissioners of his Majesty's treasury for the time being, and by no other person whatsoever.

Nevertheless, such officers were not themselves beyond suspicion. The stiffest penalty for an infraction created by any of the Intolerable Acts was reserved for any among the authorities who “shall, directly or indirectly, take or receive any bribe or reward, to connive at such lading or unlading” or who helped someone else evade the act's penalties. A fine of £500—a substantial sum equal to half the typical annual salary for a royal governor—per offense and permanent disbarment from the offender's post, whether civil or military, awaited anyone who accepted such inducements. On the other hand, the penalty for attempting to bribe such an official was set at a comparatively mild £50.

The sixth and seventh provisions deal with more mundane administrative matters. The former clause stipulates that the recovery or prosecution of fines and penalties under the act would be determined by two older acts of Parliament, one passed in 1764 that governed the sugar trade between Britain and the Caribbean colonies, and the other enacted in 1768, entitled “An act for the more easy and effectual recovery of the penalties and forfeitures inflicted by the acts of parliament relating to the trade or revenues of the British colonies and plantations in America.” The Boston Port Act's seventh condition addresses consignment and charter arrangements, declaring “utterly void” as of June 1 all bills of lading and consignment contracts to carry goods “to or from the said town of Boston, or any part of the bay or harbour thereof.”

The bill's eighth provision establishes the conditions by which Bostonians could rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the empire. If the Privy Council, along with the Crown, determined that “peace and obedience to the laws” were restored in Massachusetts Bay, then the king or the Privy Council had the authority to adjust the act's reach by establishing “open places, quays, and wharfs” within Boston Harbor, free of all commercial restrictions. According to Clause IX, individuals who used wharves that remained closed, however, were subject to the forfeitures set for illegal shipping elsewhere in the bill.

It would take more than good behavior for commercial normalcy to return to Boston. Parliament was not about to let the recent riotous events in New England be forgotten. Clause X forbids the king from doing anything to open the port or any wharves, creeks, or quays until

full satisfaction hath been made by or on behalf of the inhabitants of the said town of Boston to the united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies, for the damage sustained by the said company by the destruction of their goods sent to the said town of Boston.

The legislation also aimed to take care of Crown officers whose property had been destroyed or damaged in the unrest, setting as a final condition for withdrawal of the act “that reasonable satisfaction hath been made to the officers of his Majesty's revenue, and others, who suffered by the riots and insurrections” of the previous year.

The Massachusetts Government Act

The preamble to the Massachusetts Government Act, by far the longest and most threatening to colonial constitutional sensibilities of the Intolerable Acts, declares that the government established by charter in 1691, by which one province—Massachusetts Bay—was created out of several small colonies, was fundamentally flawed. Among the charter's imperially problematic components was the provision that allowed for the annual election by the provincial assembly of a twenty-eight-member panel that would sit as the upper body of the legislature and act as an advisory council to the governor. Unfortunately, the preamble opines, “the said method of electing such counsellors … hath, by repeated experience, been found to be extremely ill adapted to the plan of government established” in the province “and hath been so far from contributing … to the maintenance of the just subordination to, and conformity with, the laws of Great Britain.” The practice of electing the upper body in Massachusetts Bay

had the most manifest tendency to obstruct, and, in great measure, defeat, the execution of the laws; to weaken the attachment of his Majesty's well-disposed subjects in the said province to his Majesty's government, and to encourage the ill-disposed among them to proceed even to acts of direct resistance to, and defiance of, his Majesty's authority.

It “accordingly happened that an open resistance to the execution of the laws hath actually taken place in the town of Boston,” an event, the preamble implies, that everyone should have seen coming as the inevitable product of an insidious constitutional defect.

The effective section of the act provides a remedy amounting to a political coup de gr ce. In the bill's first two provisions, Parliament declares that the section of the charter of 1691 “which relates to the time and manner of electing the assistants or counsellors … is hereby revoked and made void and of none effect.” Henceforth, “the offices of all counsellors and assistants … shall be thereunto nominated and appointed by his Majesty,” to follow that practice employed in several of the other colonies, such as Virginia. Clauses III to VI grant to the governor alone, without consent of the council, the power to appoint all judges, the attorney general, sheriffs, and other court officers in the province and to remove them without the consent of the council (except for sheriffs).

Clause VII places unprecedented new limits on local authority by curtailing the frequency and purview of New England's troublesome town meetings. Because “a great abuse has been made of the power of calling [town meetings], and the inhabitants have, contrary to the design of their institution, been misled to treat upon matters of the most general concern, and to pass many dangerous and unwarrantable resolves,” no town meeting other than the single annual session could be called without written permission of the governor. Moreover, matters eligible for the consideration of annual town meetings were limited to choosing local officials and representatives to the assembly; “no other matter shall be treated of at such meetings.”

The remainder of the act, Clauses VIII through XXIV, covers matters relating to the administration of the courts, the most serious of which the alteration in Clause VIII in the manner of electing juries. The act claims that local election of jurors “affords occasion for many evil practices, and tends to pervert the free and impartial administration of justice.” Consequently, juries were no longer to be elected but were to be chosen by the sheriff of each county. Clauses IX through XIX specify the process by which future jurors would be selected and summoned, while the final provisions set out the types of cases for which juries could be employed and their costs.

The Administration of Justice Act

The Administration of Justice Act was designed to improve law and order in the province. In doing so, it employs perhaps the most inflammatory and aggressive language found in any of the Intolerable Acts, even though it and the Quartering Act were the only acts intended to be temporary. The Administration of Justice Act claims that the Bostonians had, in fact, attempted “to throw off the authority of the parliament of Great Britain” with “an actual and avowed resistance, by open force.” Being allowed to go “uncontrouled and unpunished, in defiance of his Majesty's authority, and to the subversion of all lawful government” led to “the present disordered state” of Massachusetts Bay, requiring parliamentary action. Furthermore, the act declares that provincial officials accused of stepping beyond the boundaries of the law should not be “liable to be brought to trial for the same before persons who do not acknowledge the validity of the laws.”

Clause I, therefore, was designed to ensure that colonial malefactors were adequately punished for their transgressions and that provincial officials were not criminally charged for merely unpopular actions. It grants to the governor's discretion, but with the consent of the council, the option to send those accused to be tried “in some other of his Majesty's colonies, or in Great Britain” should the governor find “that an indifferent trial cannot be had within the said province.”

Clauses II through VII cover the procedures to be followed in trials removed to other jurisdictions. All witnesses were required to be transported to appear in court for trials, wherever they were held, with their costs covered by the colony (Clause II). While the witnesses were gone from Massachusetts Bay, they were protected from any judicial action that otherwise could be commenced against them (Clause III). Clause IV allows the governor to grant bail to provincial officials, such as magistrates or justices of the peace, who had been accused of a capital crime if the act occurred “either in the execution of his duty as a magistrate, for the suppression of riots, or in the support of the laws of revenue.” Furthermore, officials who were accused could postpone all action taken against them by signaling their intent to apply to the governor for removal of the proceedings to another jurisdiction (Clause V). The sixth and seventh provisions establish that trials held in other colonies or in Great Britain “shall thereupon proceed in like manner, to all intents and purposes, as if the offence had been committed in such place” as regards questions of trial procedure, law, and appeal. If, for example, the trial were to be removed to Britain, the offense could be treated as if it “had been committed in the county of Middlesex, or in any other county of that part of Great Britain called England.” Clause VIII limits the duration of the legislation, setting forth that “every clause, provision, regulation, and thing, herein contained, shall … be, and continue in force, for and during the term of three years.”

The Quartering Act of 1774

The Quartering Act, the briefest of all, was an effort to improve housing options for British troops stationed in America. It seeks to address colonial doubts about “whether troops can be quartered otherwise than in barracks” if barracks were already provided for them by provincial and local authorities. According to the act, however, often troops had to be at a distance from their barracks and required other housing. Clauses I and II of the act, therefore, clarify the authority of commanding officers to use the then-existing law (the Quartering Act of 1765) to billet soldiers in empty houses, barns, and other outbuildings should colonial officials fail to do so within twenty-four hours of such a request for housing. Officers were also required to make “a reasonable allowance” to the owners of such buildings for their use. Contrary to Patriot rhetoric, it did not grant commanding officers the authority to impose troops on private homes. In fact, the Quartering Act of 1765 established stiff penalties, including immediate and permanent removal from the service, for any officer who attempted to do so. The final clause states that the act would remain in force until March 1776, a duration of less than two years.

The Quebec Act

Because of its timing, passing not a month after the Quartering Act, and provisions that seemed designed to inflame colonial sensibilities (both of which were entirely coincidental), the Quebec Act was considered by American radicals as one of the Intolerable Acts. In fact, the Quebec Act was a pragmatic, though perhaps imperially myopic, approach to the massive administrative problems posed by Great Britain's acquisition of the extensive territory of Catholic, French-speaking Quebec, along with the thinly populated wilderness beyond the Saint Lawrence River valley.

The first paragraph expands the boundaries of the Province of Quebec established in 1763 up the Saint Lawrence Valley, down the western edge of Pennsylvania, and along the Ohio River to the Mississippi. The next two paragraphs, however, stipulate that Quebec's new borders would affect neither the existing limits of any other British American province or those property rights granted in the land that fell within the new jurisdiction.

Paragraphs 4 through 11 recognize the political and legal problems posed by the absorption into the British Empire of more than sixty-five thousand people “professing the Religion of the Church of Rome, and enjoying an established Form of Constitution and System of Laws, by which their Persons and Property had been protected, governed, and ordered, for a long Series of Years.” The fourth paragraph “revoked, annulled, and made void” all the laws and rules that formed Quebec's existing civil government, while the fifth pargraph guarantees to Roman Catholics and their clergy the rights to practice their religion, subject to the supremacy of the British Crown. To guard against the possibility that Catholic priests might look to the authority of the Vatican before they turned to Whitehall or become an invidious fifth column in North America, paragraphs 7 and 8 require clergy to pledge to “be faithful, and bear true Allegiance to His Majesty King George” and to do their utmost “to disclose and make known to His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, all Treasons, and traitorous Conspiracies, and Attempts … against Him,… renouncing all Pardons and Dispensations from any Power or Person whomsoever to the Contrary.” Paragraphs 11 through 14 cover property rights more fully, retaining in force the existing French civil law for property and civil rights as well as the customs that determined inheritance. English law, on the other hand, having “been sensibly felt by the Inhabitants [of Quebec], from an Experience of more than Nine Years, during which it has been uniformly administered,” would govern criminal affairs.

The provisions that sanction the practice of Catholicism and a French civil law system that did not hold property rights as sacrosanct, as did the English, raised concerns among many American Patriots. The remainder of the legislation's clauses exacerbated matters by appearing to justify radical arguments that imperial officials intended to deprive colonists of their representative assemblies. Paragraph 15 states that “at present [it is] inexpedient to call an Assembly” and vests all legislative authority in the hands of a council appointed by the Crown, with the advice of the Privy Council. Unlike its colonial brethren, Quebec's council had no authority to levy province-wide taxes, but paragraph 16 stipulates that it could authorize the inhabitants of towns or districts to assess their own rates “for the Purpose of making Roads, erecting and repairing publick Buildings, or for any other Purpose respecting the local Convenience and Oeconomy of such Town or District.” In another departure from colonial legislative practice, the next two paragraphs establish tighter standards for royal review of Quebec's provincial ordinances, stipulating that all laws disallowed by the Crown would be void retroactively from their moment of passage (whereas most colonial laws struck down in Whitehall were void from the date of denial), while any law regarding religion or that provided for a punishment of more than three months' imprisonment (roughly the amount of time it took for messages to travel from Quebec to London and back again) required prior Crown approval.