John Foster Dulles: Address to the United Nations on the Suez Crisis

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

In 1956 a crisis arose in the Middle East. Many factors contributed to the crisis, including the ongoing border conflict between Egypt and Israel, British desires to maintain control of shipping in the region, and American and Soviet attempts to demonstrate regional dominance. The Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser stood at the center of the conflict. Owing to ongoing warfare with Israel, Nasser began seeking to purchase arms. In 1955, after the United States had avoided his requests for months, Nasser finally accepted a shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia, a nation in the Communist bloc, which infuriated Secretary of State Dulles. Nasser likewise appealed to the United States and the British for funding to build the dam that he believed would increase Egypt's prosperity.

Despite the initially lukewarm response from the United States, the U.S. and British governments eventually agreed to contribute to the project on the condition that the remaining funds come in the form of a loan from the World Bank. In July 1956, however, Dulles reneged on the offer. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, claiming he now needed the canal's revenue to support the dam project. Israel, whose shipments were already forbidden by Nasser from passing through the canal, increased its arms purchases from France and entered into an alliance with the British and French. Meanwhile, Dulles and the British agreed to hold an international conference in London to deal with the situation. But the conference failed to accomplish concrete changes, and Britain and France began plotting with Israel to regain control of the canal. On October 29, Israel attacked Egypt, and Britain and France sent troops to seize the canal under the guise of peacemaking. When Nasser refused to hand the canal over to the European powers, the British and French began bombing Egypt. President Eisenhower sent Dulles to the United Nations to deal with the problem. The resolution introduced to the Security Council by the United States was vetoed, but the council decided that the matter should go before the General Assembly. Dulles delivered this speech, which included the new U.S. resolution, to the General Assembly on November 1, 1956.

Dulles opens the speech by lamenting the disagreement between the United States and Israel, France, and Great Britain, the latter two of which had been long-standing allies. He notes that because the disagreement was so uncommon, the United States had reevaluated its position—but, despite reconsideration, its stance on the Suez Canal crisis remained unchanged. He observes that the current meeting marked the first time that the United Nations was summoned in accord with the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, which calls for the General Assembly to convene if the Security Council cannot resolve a matter of international security.

For much of the speech, Dulles describes the events leading up to the crisis, although he avoids mentioning the role of U.S. diplomacy in aggravating Nasser. He depicts Britain and France as the aggressors, pointing out that while they claimed that their action derived from a desire to secure the canal, they had also admitted their intent to gain control of it. In several instances, he hints that Britain and France had acted out of self-interest rather than from a desire to reestablish peace. In turn, rather than absolving Egypt of blame for the current hostilities, he criticizes that country for violating armistice agreements, ignoring the UN mandate to allow the passage of goods to Israel through the canal, accepting Soviet arms, and violating the treaty that gave control of the Suez Canal to the Universal Suez Canal Company. Dulles also spends much time outlining the decisions made at the London conference, lamenting how Great Britain and France brought the matter to the Security Council but later resorted to the use of force. If the United Nations accepted injustice and faltered on its commitment to renouncing the use of force, Dulles argues, it would become a powerless organization, and the world would face imminent doom.

Dulles continues by suggesting what the United Nations needed to do in response to the Suez crisis. At this point he presents the U.S. resolution, proposing six changes aimed at ending the conflict in Egypt. The resolution calls, first, for a cease-fire; second, for any country subject to the aforementioned armistice agreements to return their forces to territory within the stipulated national boundaries; third, for members of the United Nations to avoid importing any new arms to the region; fourth, for steps to be taken to reopen the Suez Canal following the cease-fire; fifth, for the UN secretary-general to study the progress made as a result of the resolution and report it to the Security Council and the General Assembly; and sixth, for the United Nations to stay in emergency session until the conditions of the resolution are met. After reading the U.S. resolution, Dulles admits that it was incomplete and certainly would not solve all of the problems in the region. But, he contends, something had to be done to end the ongoing conflict.

In closing, Dulles tries to impress upon his audience the importance of passing the resolution. He states that if the United Nations were not to take action immediately, the conflict in and around Egypt would most likely broaden. In addition, Dulles fears that if the United Nations were not to take action it would be viewed as weak, and other countries would begin using force without fear of reprisal. He even states that while he once thought that World War II represented the worst of war, he now believes that the future holds worse misfortune.

Dulles's speech evidently impressed the General Assembly; the following day, it voted to adopt the U.S. resolution, and France, Great Britain, and Israel immediately began withdrawing forces from the region. Dulles and Eisenhower had also hoped that the stance against Great Britain and France would distance the United States from the former imperial superpowers and help it win the support of nonaligned nations, but the resolution and speech seemed to have little effect on international views of the United States. To Dulles's chagrin, the Soviet Union actually made concrete gains in the region as a result of the crisis. In addition to cementing regional trade and arms sales, the USSR threatened on November 5 to take military action against Great Britain and France if they did not pull out of the region. Both were already in the process of withdrawing their troops as stipulated by the U.S. resolution, but the Soviets spun the situation in the media so that many people worldwide believed that the crisis was resolved by the Soviet Union, not the United States or United Nations.