John Foster Dulles: Radio and Television Address on Communism in Guatemala

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

In 1954 the United States became embroiled in a conflict with Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the reformist president of Guatemala. Dulles stood at the forefront of this conflict—and, as some argued, was its major instigator. Dulles had two major concerns with the changes occurring in Guatemala under Arbenz. Publicly, Dulles complained that Arbenz was a stooge of international Communism and that, as per the domino theory, his rule opened the door to Communist infiltration throughout the Western Hemisphere. Privately, Dulles was also concerned about the financial effects of Arbenz's agrarian reform on the United Fruit Company, for which Dulles and his brother, Allen, both sat on the board of directors. Dulles attempted to cajole Arbenz into resigning, first individually and then with the aid of the Organization of American States. When that failed, John Dulles and Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recruited, trained, and funded Guatemalans (primarily military men disenchanted with Arbenz's policies), who then overthrew the Arbenz regime in June 1954. In this statement, which Dulles issued shortly after the coup, he explains the geostrategic reasons for U.S. interest in Guatemala while downplaying economic concerns. Here, as elsewhere, he does not divulge his role in the coup, instead claiming, “The situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.”

Dulles begins his address by painting a picture of events in Guatemala as he wanted the American public to see them. He omits information that did not conform to his narrative and at times presents speculation as fact. Throughout the first portion, Dulles emphasizes the connection between the Arbenz regime and international Communism. Little of the address discusses events and politics in Guatemala as such. He instead speaks in broad terms, presenting the Guatemalan situation in the context of “Soviet despotism” and casting the situation as a conflict between the “inter-American system” and “the Kremlin.” Careful not to blame Guatemala or specific Guatemalans for the situation that had unfolded, Dulles explains that over the previous ten years international Communists infiltrated all aspects of Guatemalan politics and society, so that they eventually pulled the strings of both the congress and the president. He points out that although Guatemala was a small country, it was of great significance.

Dulles then focuses on the support for a new Guatemalan regime shared by the other countries in the Organization of American States. He brings up the March 1954 meeting in the Venezuelan capital, in which a declaration condemning incursions of international Communism into the Western Hemisphere was adopted, with Guatemala as the only dissenting state. In Dulles's version of events, the Declaration of Caracas caused the international Communists controlling Guatemala to begin a massive offensive, ordering arms from abroad, increasing efforts to take over neighboring countries, and ruthlessly suppressing internal political dissent.

Events had actually unfolded somewhat differently in early 1954. Dulles attended the meeting of the Organization of American States determined to see the passage of a declaration condemning the Arbenz regime. He easily obtained the support of Latin America's various authoritarian leaders, many of whom were cut from the same cloth as Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan opponent of Arbenz, and courted U.S. support. Those who did not initially support the resolution were coerced into doing so. Mexico and Argentina, two of the most powerful Latin American nations, abstained from voting. Arbenz, recognizing the gravity of the situation, returned to his country, believing that he faced imminent attack from a militarily superior enemy, and began to search for an arms supplier. After pursuing a number of unsuccessful avenues, he received a shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia on May 15, 1954. It was on the basis of this transaction that Dulles believed the alliance between Arbenz and the Soviet Union to be clearly established.

In the final section, Dulles addresses U.S. economic interests in Guatemala for the only time during the speech, in describing recent events in Guatemala and assuring both Americans and Guatemalans that the recent coup would have positive ramifications for all. Dulles mentions the tumultuous relationship between Guatemala and the United Fruit Company in response to what he characterizes as unjust Communist claims that the United States was merely motivated by imperialist concerns. He states that although the dispute between the fruit company and the Guatemalan government was regrettable, it was “relatively unimportant.” Dulles continues by informing the public that Arbenz had resigned under pressure from “patriots” “led by Col. Castillo Armas.” According to Dulles, Guatemala was thus newly free from the despotic representatives of international Communism and the Guatemalan people could now determine their own fate. He concludes with two major points. First, he warns of the continued need to vigilantly guard against Communism; the danger of Communist infiltration still remained. In addition, he assures the Guatemalan people that the U.S. government would continue to support their country.

Both the American public and Dulles's government colleagues seem to have reacted positively to his address. Few in the government knew the extent of Dulles's role in the coup, and nearly no one in the private sector had knowledge about events on the ground in Guatemala at the time of Armas's coup. In 1954, as throughout his career, Dulles was received as a virulent “cold warrior” who took necessary measures to protect his country. His description of the threat posed by Guatemala was based on the domino theory, which American politicians and civilians living in 1954 knew well. His presentation of the events that unfolded in Guatemala would have sounded familiar; the public had no reason to challenge his version.

For many years following the Armas coup, “Operation Success,” as it was dubbed by the Central Intelligence Agency, was regarded as a model for U.S. response to the perceived threat of Communism throughout the globe. It was not until the failed attempt to train, arm, and fund Cuban expatriates to invade Cuba and overthrow Fidel Castro's regime in 1961 that American policy makers discovered that the model masterminded by Dulles would not always succeed. Nonetheless, covert operations modeled on Operation Success continued into the 1980s, often bringing the desired results.