John Quincy Adams: Diary Entries on the Monroe Doctrine

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Spain's inability to retain its continental American empire in the early 1820s created a new set of opportunities and challenges for the United States and Secretary of State Adams. The nation extended formal recognition to Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and others but was wary that Spain's allies in the Holy Alliance, which included Austria, Russia, and France, might try to restore the colonies and militarily challenge the United States if it attempted to oppose them. Great Britain, however, presented the greater obstacle to recolonization as new trading partners emerged in Central and South America. The British invited the United States to stand with them in opposition to Spain's reconquest. The unilateral response of the United States was ultimately announced in President James Monroe's annual message of December 2, 1823, three paragraphs of which became known as the Monroe Doctrine.

As early as July 1823 Adams notes in his diary that he had made it clear to the Russian ambassador Baron de Tuyll van Serooskerken that the United States had decided that the time for colonization in the Western Hemisphere was over. In asserting the principle of noncolonization, Adams was blunter than President Monroe felt comfortable with. Adams sent similar instructions to the American minister to Great Britain.

A second principle of the ultimate Monroe Doctrine is apparent in Adams's report of conversation with the president and cabinet in November 1823. Adams followed the policies of George Washington and succeeding presidents by advocating staying out of the affairs of Europe. President Monroe and others in the cabinet, however, were interested in supporting the Greek revolution for independence from Turkey. Secretary of State Adams on November 22 tells of urging restraint to the president, who would ultimately agree. Adams, however, would take the policy further. The third principle of the Monroe Doctrine would stress that Europe should not only abandon colonization but also cease to interfere in the affairs of independent American nations.

Both Monroe and Adams agreed that the United States should not become a weak partner with Great Britain, but the question of whether the three principles of the Monroe Doctrine could be sustained caused some anxiety. Again, it was Adams who had the key insight. He feared the Holy Alliance much less than did Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and saw England as the more important player. But, as he argues on November 25, it was in England's economic interest to defend the Monroe Doctrine even if the United States issued it unilaterally. If Monroe were to assert the three principles “promptly and decisively,” the nation could augment its reputation and lend moral support to Latin America while letting the British supply the military component if necessary. Events proved Adams right.