Lend-Lease Act

Impact

Although it represented a major victory for President Roosevelt's pro-British foreign policy, the passage of the Lend-Lease Act did not lead the United States immediately into World War II. Such a development had been expected by many of Roosevelt's opponents in America, who feared the possibility, and officials in Britain, who welcomed it. The evidence suggests, however, that Roosevelt sincerely believed in Lend-Lease in the sense that he still hoped, in the weeks after the act was passed, to be able to defeat Germany by serving as a giant arsenal for Britain without sending large numbers of American soldiers and sailors to war. In Roosevelt's mind, at least, the act did not automatically commit the United States to all-out participation in the global war.

By putting into place a mechanism for placing huge quantities of American-made goods in the hands of its Allies, the Lend-Lease Act had tremendous effects on the progress of World War II. Among the most important was the stimulus that Lend-Lease provided to convert American industry to war production, a conversion that began nine months before the attacks on Pearl Harbor. Although the pre-Lend-Lease cash purchases of Britain and France had already begun to do this, the initial $7 billion appropriation for Lend-Lease, supplemented in October 1941 by an additional appropriation of nearly $6 billion, helped prepare the American economy for the even greater demands for munitions after Pearl Harbor. This early Lend-Lease spending was an important component of the risingvolume of government orders that evidently pulled the country out of a decade-long economic depression.

The significance of Lend-Lease for the military performance of America's allies is much debated. Few would dispute that the Lend-Lease shipments of food, machinery, and munitions were welcomed by soldiers and civilians in Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, but it is not clear exactly how much of a difference the American-made goods made in their struggles against the Axis forces. In 1941, when many orders were placed but the volume of Lend-Lease shipments remained low, the act's most important effects were probably more psychological than material. While the effects of Lend-Lease on the morale of Allied soldiers and civilians are impossible to measure, it was surely comforting to know that important supplies were forthcoming from the world's largest national economy; conversely, the passage of the act was surely damaging to Axis morale.

In any case, the material assistance provided by Lend-Lease in 1941, when Britain and the Soviet Union both avoided defeat, was relatively tiny. Only about 1 percent of Britain's available munitions in 1941 were provided via Lend-Lease. On the other hand, over the course of the entire war, the economic and military value of Lend-Lease was considerable. Over half of Allied munitions were made in the United States. Although over four-fifths of the tanks and aircraft used by Soviet forces were manufactured by the Soviets themselves, the United States provided four hundred thousand trucks and jeeps, nearly two thousand railroad locomotives, large quantities of petroleum products, and $1.6 billion worth of agricultural goods, which evidently made important contributions to thequality of the Soviets' logistics and food supply. The largest recipient of Lend-Lease aid was the United Kingdom, which received $21 billion worth of goods, double the amount provided to the Soviets. The British Empire (including the United Kingdom) was provided a total of $30 billion worth of goods, or 60 percent of the value of all Lend-Lease shipments. So-called reverse Lend-Lease supplies provided to American forces by the British Empire were valued at about $6 billion.

The termination of Lend-Lease in 1945, which historians often describe as having been poorly handled and excessively abrupt, caused America's Allies to lower their opinions of the extent of America's generosity in what Churchill had called in 1941 the “most unsordid act.” In early 1945 Congress amended Section 3(c) of the original act to prohibit any aid for postwar relief or reconstruction. President Roosevelt's death in April 1945 elevated Harry S. Truman to the presidency. Truman was less able and willing to resist the many members of Congress and military leaders who called for a swift end to Lend-Lease shipments after the Allied victory in Europe. In May and July, Truman issued orders to limit Lend-Lease that alienated both British and Soviet officials, who felt that they had paid amply for Lend-Lease in the blood, sweat, and tears expended in a victory that benefited the United States. They were also disappointed by America's unwillingness to use Lend-Lease to provide substantial postwar assistance.

Immediately after the defeat of Japan in August and that country's surrender in September, Lend-Lease ended. (An exception was made for China, which continued to receive large shipments through the end of the year.) Although the British were never asked to repay more than a small fraction of the total value of the goods they had received, they did submit to American demands that they lower trade barriers. Many in Britain felt that Americans were taking advantage of the situation to extend their new global dominance; Anglo-American relations now cooled. Meanwhile, the wartime alliance with the Soviets was quickly replaced with the beginnings of a potentially disastrous rivalry. By the time the United States created a kind of postwar equivalent of Lend-Lease in the form of the Marshall Plan approved by Congress in early 1948, the cold war was well under way.