Prigg v. Pennsylvania

( 1842 ) Commentary by Paul Finkelman, Albany Law School

“The [Fugitive Slave] clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave which no state law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain. The slave is not to be discharged from service or labor in consequence of any state law or regulation.” - Joseph Story: Majority Opinion
“It is proper to state that we are by no means to be understood … to doubt or to interfere with the police power belonging to the States in virtue of their general sovereignty. That police power extends over all subjects within territorial limits of the States, and has never been conceded to the United States. … The States … possesses full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them from their borders.” - Joseph Story: Majority Opinion
“According to the opinion just delivered, the state authorities are prohibited from interfering for the purpose of protecting the right of the master and aiding him in the recovery of his property. I think the States are not prohibited, and that, on the contrary, it is enjoined upon them as a duty to protect and support the owner when he is endeavoring to obtain possession of his property found within their respective territories.” - Roger B. Taney: Concurrence
“The slave is found in a State where every man, black or white, is presumed to be free, and this State, to preserve the peace of its citizens, and its soil and jurisdiction from acts of violence, has prohibited the forcible abduction of persons of color. Does this law conflict with the Constitution? It clearly does not, in its terms.” - John McLean: Concurrence

Joseph Story (Library of Congress)

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Prigg v. Pennsylvania

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