Robert E. Lee: Letter to Jefferson Davis (1863)

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Although he scored several key victories in his first year as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee bemoaned the fact that he could not transform any of those battlefield triumphs into an event of far larger strategic significance. After he beat back a series of Union attacks at Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, despite the damage he inflicted upon the enemy, he regretted that the outcome was not beneficial enough. Nor was he completely satisfied with the results of his most spectacular battlefield triumph, at Chancellorsville (April 30–May 6, 1863), where he defeated an enemy force twice the size of his own, though at heavy cost. Once more he chose to cross the Potomac north; once more he sought to impress his president with the political advantages that might accrue from such an offensive.

In this letter to Davis, Lee argues that it is important for Confederate politicians to say nothing that might dampen talk of a peaceful resolution of the conflict by northerners. By 1863 some northern Democrats were charging that the war was a failure, that reunion by coercion was doomed, and that the time had come to negotiate a settlement. Whether Confederate independence would be part of such a settlement remained open to discussion. Lee argues, then, that it would be best not to preclude any efforts at negotiation; if such negotiations were to take place, northerners might well come to accept Confederate independence as talks dragged on without evidence of Union progress on the battlefield. Implicit in Lee's letter is the notion that Confederate resources were not inexhaustible: “Our resources in men are constantly diminishing.” Lee believes it critical for the Confederacy to use whatever means are available, including deception, to weaken northern resolve. Thus, he concludes, it would be important to welcome any talk of negotiations without mentioning any preconditions, including the recognition of Confederate independence. Lee remarks that should his invasion of Pennsylvania prove a success, that result would add to the northern cry for peace and an acceptance of an independent Confederacy.

Davis might well have replied that to enter into such negotiations without any assurance regarding independence could demoralize support for the Confederacy in the South. Other observers might have noted that Lee was perhaps overestimating the number of northerners willing to talk peace, especially at a time when the Union general Ulysses S. Grant's Army of Tennessee was laying siege to Vicksburg, Mississippi. The Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, which proved costly in terms of both manpower and leadership losses, rendered the discussion moot. Lee may have at first secured the upper hand on the battlefield, but by the end of 1863 it was evident that his victories had come at such a cost that he was unable to exploit them to much advantage.