Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

Context

The Monroe Doctrine had first been enunciated by President James Monroe in his annual message to Congress in December 1823. The doctrine, the brainchild of his secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, set out several propositions governing American relations with European countries relative to the Western Hemisphere. North and South America, said Monroe, were not areas where European nations should look for further colonization. If they did so, the United States would take appropriate action (though they would have to depend on the fleet of Great Britain to make such moves stick). Over the rest of the nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine came up on occasion, as when the French set up a puppet regime in Mexico during the mid-1860s and in the Venezuelan crisis with Great Britain in 1895 and 1896, when the U.S. demanded that Britain submit its boundary dispute with Venezuela for arbitration.

By the early twentieth century, the Monroe Doctrine was a well-established precept of American foreign policy. When Roosevelt took over the presidency after the death of William McKinley in September 1901, the United States faced new challenges in Latin America that went beyond the limits of the Monroe Doctrine. For Roosevelt, the essential priorities, taken over from McKinley, were to build a canal across Central America and to make the Caribbean basin an area of clear United States dominance.

In the case of the canal, Roosevelt proceeded to do that through the process of first negotiating with Colombia for a canal across Panama, which was then part of the Colombian nation. When the government in Bogotá declined to accept Roosevelt's terms in the treaty the two countries had negotiated, he encouraged a revolution in Panama that would see that country secede from Colombia. Once that was accomplished in late 1903, Roosevelt and his secretary of state, John Hay, worked out a treaty with the new Panamanian government that gave the United States the canal zone and the right to construct a canal.

The experience of working with the politicians in Colombia on this matter did not instill confidence in their ability as far as Roosevelt was concerned. Believing that the United States had the superior political system and culture, he looked down on the abilities and honesty of Latin American officials. Like so many in the United States, he believed that Americans were more intelligent, further advanced, and more responsible than their neighbors to the South. As a result, in Roosevelt's mind it was acceptable for the government to impose discipline and order on peoples who lacked those qualities on their own. Racism and ethnocentrism would play a large part in Roosevelt's approach to foreign relations during his presidency.

The president and his advisers also were aware of what they perceived to be a renewed threat from European nations to test the limits of the Monroe Doctrine. Latin American countries had borrowed funds from investors in Europe to finance economic development within their impoverished territories. When corruption, a lack of skill, or bad luck saw these investments go sour, Great Britain, Germany, and other powers asserted their right to compel the Latin American nations to pay their debts. On some occasions, these demands were backed up with gunboat diplomacy and naval blockades. The presence of foreign vessels in the Caribbean for such purposes disturbed Roosevelt and the American military.

One nation that caused special concern was the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The U.S. government watched with unease the penetration of the Germans into the Caribbean, a process that began during the McKinley administration. German trade with the region was growing, and German settlers were making homes in South American nations. Was Berlin endeavoring to create a permanent presence in the region? The United States could not be sure of German intentions. These developments prompted American policy makers to consider what would happen if the Germans sought a naval base near the Caribbean. As a result, the United States and Great Britain drew closer together, and U.S. relations with Berlin grew less amicable.

An episode in 1902 underscored the American suspicion about the Germans and provided background for the Roosevelt statement in 1904. Germany had made extensive loans to the dictator of Venezuela, Cipriano Castro, reaching some seventy million marks. Castro did not pay any interest on these loans and in 1901 indicated that he did not plan to repay the money either. Great Britain went through a comparable experience with the Venezuelan ruler. The only feasible solution in the minds of Kaiser Wilhelm and his advisers was a blockade of Venezuela to collect the money that was owed.

This course raised questions for the U.S. government. The Germans told the Americans that they had no plans to establish permanent bases in Venezuela. They did concede, however, that they might have to occupy on a temporary basis some harbors in Venezuela where they could collect duties from foreign ships trading in those waters. Those assertions troubled Roosevelt, who worried that temporary occupations had a way of turning into more permanent arrangements. The Germans were reminded that a permanent base of any kind would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and traditional American foreign policy.

A year later, at the end of 1902, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy decided to blockade Castro's regime. The dictator rejected a European ultimatum, and the powers acted to compel him to give in. Faced with overwhelming power, Castro agreed to have the dispute submitted to international arbitration. Negotiations then broke down, and the European fleets remained in place. Shelling of Venezuelan installations took place in January 1903. Through all of these events, the United States kept its fleet on alert and ready to act if matters should get out of hand. For Roosevelt and the navy, there were some suggestions that the United States might not prevail in the event of a confrontation with Germany. The experience compelled Roosevelt to think about the Monroe Doctrine and his attitude toward protecting Latin American governments from the consequences of their own mistakes. He would later observe that his relations with Berlin and its attitude toward Latin America played a large part in shaping how he formulated the Roosevelt Corollary.

With the Panamanian and Venezuelan episodes in mind, Roosevelt took steps in the spring of 1904 to articulate the views that would find expression in his annual message. He asked his former secretary of war, Elihu Root, to read a letter at a dinner in May celebrating the second anniversary of the founding of the Cuban Republic following the war with Spain. In this document, Roosevelt said, “All we desire is to see all neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous.” The president then went on to say, however, that “brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty.” He added that all he and his country asked of his Latin American neighbors was that “they shall govern themselves well, and be prosperous and orderly” (Roosevelt to Root, May 20, 1904; qtd. in Roosevelt, 1951–1954, vol. 4, p. 801). Roosevelt put it with more candor in a letter to Root a month later. If the United States was saying “‘hands off' to the powers of Europe, then sooner or later, we must keep order ourselves” (Roosevelt to Root, June 7, 1904; qtd. in Roosevelt, 1951–1954, vol. 4, pp. 821–822).

The nation that seemed to Roosevelt incapable of managing its own affairs at this time was the Dominican Republic. The government of that country had run up some $32 million in debts, most of them with European investors. By the opening months of 1904, reports reached Washington, D.C., that the Dominican economy was deteriorating. There were disclosures of apparent German interest in the area. The government of the island dispatched its foreign minister to request American aid. Roosevelt decided to be cautious in making a commitment. As he wrote in February 1904, “I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to” (Roosevelt to Joseph Bucklin Bishop, February 23, 1904; qtd. in Roosevelt, 1951–1954, vol. 4, p. 734).

With the impending election of 1904, Roosevelt concluded that his best strategy was to see what would happen in the Dominican crisis. As he did so, the financial condition of that country further worsened. Following his victory in the presidential election of November 1904, Roosevelt confronted complaints from European countries about the failure of the Dominican government to meet its claims. It was in this context that Roosevelt considered what to do in terms of asserting his view of the responsibilities of the governments in Latin America. The annual message, when he spoke to the whole nation and the world, seemed an ideal moment to set forth his ideas about the role of the United States relative to its neighbors.