South Carolina v. Katzenbach

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

The central question in South Carolina v. Katzenbach was the power of Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965, with all of its sweeping and transformative powers—powers that the federal government had never before claimed or applied in the realm of voting rights. In its complaint, South Carolina had attacked the Voting Rights Act as an unconstitutional encroachment on “an area reserved to the States by the Constitution,” as a violation of the principle of equality between the states, and as an illegal bill of attainder (a legislative punishment enforced without due process of law). More specifically, the complaint directly challenged the “triggering mechanism” in Section 4 that brought South Carolina under the act’s provisions, objected to that section’s “temporary suspension of a State’s voting tests or devices,” and argued that Section 5’s preclearance provisions exceeded Congress’s constitutional powers. Also receiving special notice was the act’s use of examiners to supervise state electoral procedures.

The federal government had responded to these charges by noting the long history of race-based discrimination as practiced in South Carolina and other southern states, stressing the pressing need for reform, and showing the failure of the case-by-case litigation approach in combating voting discrimination under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964. More generally, the government lawyers stressed Congress’s supreme authority to act in these matters under its inherent legislative powers.

“Mr. Chief Justice Warren Delivered the Opinion of the Court”

In responding to these arguments, Chief Justice Warren began the Court’s opinion with the recognition that any ruling as to “the constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965” had to be “judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflected.” That context was the extensive record of race-based discrimination found throughout the South. The Court identified “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.” Noting also the history of “unsuccessful remedies,” it accepted the need for “sterner and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 thus reflected “Congress’ firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.” The crucial question before the Court, therefore, was the constitutional legitimacy of this “complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant.” Did Congress have the power to pass such laws? And assuming that Congress had such broad powers, were such new and innovative enforcement techniques as preclearance a legitimate application of Congress’s powers under the Fifteenth Amendment? Moreover, did these new powers come into conflict with other fundamental constitutional rights and doctrines, such as that of “the equality of States,” “due process,” and the ban on federal courts issuing “advisory opinions”?

In terms of the general question of Congress’s power to legislate, the Court’s answer was short and direct: In light of the many years of southern obstruction, Congress had every right to decide “to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.” The Fifteenth Amendment, combined with established constitutional interpretation, clearly authorized Congress to “effectuate the prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.” Besides, noted Warren, the act’s provisions strictly applied to those states where discrimination was most prevalent, which clearly constituted “a permissible method of dealing with the problem.”

But what of the specific provisions of the act? The Court again came down fully in support of Congress’s powers to act as it saw fit. In the case of the coverage formula, which limited the scope of the act to certain southern states and counties, the Court held that the formula was relevant to the specific problem. That was enough to justify congressional intervention under the “express powers under the Fifteenth Amendment.”

The Court endorsed the act’s temporary suspension of existing voting qualifications on the ground that Congress “knew that continuance of the tests and devices in use … , no matter how fairly administered in the future, would freeze the effect of past discrimination in favor of unqualified white registrants.” Given this fact, Congress’s determination that such tests were in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment was “a legitimate response to the problem, for which there is ample precedent under other constitutional provisions.”

Perhaps most important, Warren found that the imposition of a preclearance requirement for any changes to existing or new election laws and procedures was constitutionally permissible. “This may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power,” explained Warren, “but the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.” For years southern states had avoided the intent of the law by “the extraordinary stratagem” of devising ad hoc regulations to frustrate “adverse federal court decrees.” Congress knew this and properly acted to put a stop to future evasions of the law. Given such “unique circumstances,” Warren concluded, “Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner.”

In conclusion, Warren noted how “after enduring nearly a century of widespread resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent weapons against the evil, with authority in the Attorney General to employ them effectively.” This was a good and necessary thing, one that should be applauded. “We here hold that the portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.” The opinion concludes by expressing hope for true equality of democratic participation for all: “We may finally look forward to the day when truly ‘the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’”

“Mr. Justice Black, Concurring and Dissenting”

Only one justice dissented from this opinion, and he did so only in response to a single aspect of the ruling. Justice Hugo Black agreed with “substantially all of the Court’s opinion sustaining the power of Congress under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.” His only concern was with Section 5 and preclearance.

First, on purely technical ground, Black argued that “the Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases and controversies only.” Such was not the case with preclearance. Black found it hard “to believe that a justiciable controversy can arise in the constitutional sense from a desire by the United States Government or some of its officials to determine in advance what legislative provisions a State may enact or what constitutional amendments it may adopt.” This was regulation, not litigation.

Second, and much more important, Section 5 distorted “our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.” The federal government was a limited government under a constitution that reserved all powers not explicitly granted to the federal government to the states or the people. Such was not the case with Section 5. Black feared that forcing local laws to be preapproved in Washington could “create the impression that the State or States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces.”

Despite Justice Black’s worries and concerns, South Carolina v. Katzenbach was a sweeping endorsement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Notwithstanding that act’s innovative—and to some, constitutionally radical—enforcement approaches, the justices concluded that the scope of the problem demanded extreme action and thus gave the act their full support,