Theodore Roosevelt: Letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Although it is not well known, Roosevelt's letter of July 25, 1903, to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reveals much about the style and the substance of his foreign policy. Roosevelt was a sophisticated thinker who had a firm grasp of the complexities of the world of the early twentieth century and who devised his initiatives accordingly. While he charted the broad course of U.S. foreign relations, Roosevelt was also a hands-on diplomatist who often attended personally to the significant details of important foreign policy problems. He adhered to the maxim “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” His usual preference was to conduct diplomacy informally via private communications dispatched outside the established channels. As for substance, the president believed that morality and national honor must be major considerations in the foreign policy arena. And the cornerstone of Rooseveltian statecraft was a determined, ongoing, and highly successful effort to build a strong partnership between Great Britain and the United States. Roosevelt's letter to Holmes illustrates all of these aspects of his diplomacy.

The Alaskan boundary dispute grew out of Canadian claims—sparked by a gold rush in the region of Canada's Klondike River in the late 1890s—to territory that the United States, Britain, and Canada had considered American since the U.S. acquisition of Alaska from Russia in 1867. Britain felt obliged to uphold Canada's contention out of loyalty to a self-governing colony that had contributed substantially to Britain's recent difficult war against the Boers in southern Africa. But for his part, Roosevelt perceived “the Canadian contention” as “an outrage pure and simple” (qtd. in Tilchin, p. 38).

Roosevelt's view of the Alaskan boundary dispute as a question of international morality and national honor was, however, far from the whole of the matter. From the outset of his presidency, Roosevelt had been striving with commitment to forge a special relationship between Britain and America. He looked upon Germany, Russia, and Japan as potential enemies of the United States, whereas, in sharp contrast, he saw Britain as a natural and essential U.S. friend. Roosevelt viewed Britain and the United States as sharing not only a language but also a common political and cultural heritage and destiny. Moreover, the two countries' international interests tended to coincide. Especially, Roosevelt anticipated that an unofficial Anglo-American alliance would bring together Britain's unparalleled Royal Navy and the increasingly formidable U.S. Navy to form a potent deterrent to aggression by any rival powers. Thus, concerning the Alaskan border dispute, Roosevelt intended to do his best not to undermine his pursuit of U.S.-British solidarity while still upholding the rights and honor of the United States.

Rooseveltian “big stick” diplomacy typically featured demonstrations of U.S. naval power, most dramatically toward Germany during the Venezuelan crisis of 1902–1903 and, several years later, toward Japan. But Britain, too, was confronted with a big stick—in this case forces of the U.S. Army—during the Alaskan quarrel. Big stick diplomacy was grounded in a series of principles, one of which was to avoid humiliating the targeted country. Therefore, the U.S. troops dispatched by Roosevelt to the disputed area in March 1902 were to be transferred there “as quietly and unostentatiously as possible” (qtd. in Tilchin, p. 38).

Having consented in January 1903 to the establishment of a boundary commission of three Americans (who together could prevent an unacceptable decision), two Canadians, and one Briton, and having studied and mastered all the intricacies of the disagreement, Roosevelt proceeded over the next nine months to engage personally and intensively in the quest for a satisfactory resolution. He utilized a number of agents, including Holmes, to relay his ideas and his bottom-line positions privately to the British government. In his letter to Holmes, while expressing his adamancy on the core issue—the “indefensible … claim of the Canadians for access to deep water along any part of the Canadian coast”—Roosevelt extends himself in an effort to signal the aspects of the question on which he would be willing to yield and thereby to limit the awkwardness of a British retreat. Thus, he states, “there is room for argument about the islands in the mouth of the Portland Channel.” (Canada would end up with the two largest of those four islands.) Roosevelt's many agents would make sure that “the English understand my purpose.” If it became necessary, Roosevelt planned “to run the line as we claim it,” but first he wished “to exhaust every effort to have the affair settled peacefully and with due regard to England's dignity.” The president's adept hands-on diplomacy accomplished its objective. Despite Canadian protests, Britain accepted the concessions offered by Roosevelt and settled the Alaskan dispute. A satisfied Roosevelt would always believe—correctly—that this settlement had removed the last major obstacle impeding his drive for Anglo-American unity.

One broader observation might be added. Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt was almost uniformly successful both in his dealings with specific foreign policy problems and in conceiving and implementing an overall strategy. His Alaskan diplomacy—of which his letter to Holmes was one important part—helps illuminate why “in the foreign policy arena Roosevelt was probably the greatest of all U.S. presidents” (Tilchin, pp. ix–x).