United States v. Amistad

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Story’s opinion begins by summarizing the facts of the case in paragraph 1. Then, in paragraphs 2 through 7, Story summarizes the convoluted legal proceedings that resulted in the case’s being heard before the U.S. Supreme Court. To review briefly: At issue in the case was who was entitled to the ship and its cargo and what was to be the fate of the Africans on the ship. Were the Africans, in fact, slaves to be returned to the owner who claimed them, or were they free men who had been kidnapped from Africa illegally and hence to be freed to return to Africa?

The key paragraph in Story’s summary of the legal proceedings to date is paragraph 6, which notes that on January 23, 1840, a district court had ruled on the various matters before it. In addition to the salvage claims, the court “decreed that they [that is, the “negroes”] should be delivered to the President of the United States, to be transported to Africa, pursuant to the act of 3d March, 1819.” The act in question was the Act of March 3, 1819, Relative to the Slave Trade, which was crucial to the case and which read in part:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, whenever he shall deem it expedient, to cause any of the armed vessels of the United States, to be employed to cruise on any of the coasts of the United States, or territories thereof, or of the coast of Africa, or elsewhere, where he may judge attempts may be made to carry on the slave trade by citizens or residents of the United States, in contravention of the acts of Congress prohibiting the same.

Paragraph 7 then notes that the district court ruling was appealed and that the appellate court simply affirmed the rulings of the district court. Accordingly, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Story’s analysis of the case and his ruling begin with paragraph 8, where he lays out what he perceives to be the two central issues in the case: whether, under the terms of the 1795 treaty with Spain (often called Pinckney’s Treaty or, more formally, the Treaty of San Lorenzo or the Treaty of Madrid), sufficient proof was given as the to the ownership of the ship, its cargo, and the Africans; and whether the U.S. government has a right to intervene in the case. It should be noted that at this point in the proceedings, the United States, as one of the parties to the case, was simply attempting to defend the rights of Spain under the treaty; the U.S. government was not, for example, asserting any ownership rights over the ship, cargo, and Africans, nor was it interested in prosecuting the Africans for their mutiny aboard the ship. A second party to the case, Lieutenant Thomas Gedney, was still trying to assert his right to the ship and cargo as salvage; in connection with this claim, the term “libel” is used, but in this context, the word refers simply to an admiralty lawsuit, or a lawsuit brought under the laws of the sea. Finally, the third party to the case consists of the Africans led by Cinqué, who were asserting that they were not slaves and should be granted their freedom.

From the standpoint of African American history and the history of the abolition of the slave trade, the core of Story’s opinion begins with paragraph 12. In this paragraph, Story examines the U.S. treaty with Spain and searches for the clause in the treaty that would apply in this case. The treaty was designed to establish rights when, for example, a ship flying under one country’s flag was pursued by pirates and had to put into a port of the other country. An alternative case would be a ship of one country that had to be rescued by a ship from the other because it was, for example, sinking. The purpose of the treaty was simply to agree that one country’s property should be returned by the other. The facts in the Amistad case, though, did not conform precisely to any of the clauses in the treaty with Spain. Accordingly, it was up to the Supreme Court to determine what the property rights were. With regard to the ship and its cargo, the issue was relatively simple. The more complicated issue involved the Africans and whether they were “merchandise” under the terms of the treaty.

In paragraph 13, Story takes up this issue. He uses some Latin legal language, including the phrase onus probandi, which means “burden of proof.” Additionally, he uses the phrase casus foederis, which literally means “case of the alliance” and refers to a situation in which the terms of an alliance between nations come into play. He concludes in this paragraph that “these negroes never were the lawful slaves of Ruiz or Montez, or of any other Spanish subjects.” He goes on to say that “they are natives of Africa, and were kidnapped there, and were unlawfully transported to Cuba, in violation of the laws and treaties of Spain, and the most solemn edicts and declarations of that government.” But then the question arises as to whether the Africans, because of their mutiny, were “pirates or robbers.” In paragraph 14, Story concludes: “If, then, these negroes are not slaves, but are kidnapped Africans, who, by the laws of Spain itself, are entitled to their freedom, and were kidnapped and illegally” then “they cannot be deemed pirates or robbers in the sense of the law of nations, or the treaty with Spain, or the laws of Spain itself.”

Paragraph 15 takes up the issue of the evidence that the Africans were the property of the Spaniards who claimed them. Story acknowledges that, in general, the U.S. government is obligated to accept any proof of ownership asserted by the citizens of another country and is not obligated to “look behind” any documents the presumed owner provides. Story concedes that the Spaniards’ documents would normally be taken as “prima facie” evidence that they, in fact, owned the Africans. But Story goes on to reject the notion that the documents have to be accepted at face value. Such documents can be “impugned for fraud,” and if they are found to be fraudulent, they do not have to be accepted as proof. Put simply, Story asserts that the ownership documents of the Spaniards are fraudulent, and therefore the U.S. government is under no obligation to accept them. In paragraph 16, then, Story concludes that if the Africans are not slaves but “free negroes,” then the U.S. treaty with Spain is inoperative and “the United States are bound to respect their rights as much as those of Spanish subjects.” He states that “the treaty with Spain never could have intended to take away the equal rights of all foreigners” and, on the basis of “the eternal principles of justice and international law,” he concludes that “these negroes ought to be deemed free; and that the Spanish treaty interposes no obstacle to the just assertion of their rights.”

Paragraph 17 takes up the question of what is to be done with the Africans. The problem Story faced was this: If Africans were brought into the country illegally in contravention of laws prohibiting the slave trade, then the United States, in the person of the president, was obligated to return them to Africa. The problem here was the circumstances under which the Africans had set foot on U.S. soil. They were not brought by slave traders. They, in essence, brought themselves by seizing the ship, and when they arrived in the United States, they had no intention of becoming slaves. Accordingly, Story rules that the United States is under no obligation to return them to Africa.

Paragraph 19 briefly affirms the right of Lieutenant Gedney to salvage. That is, the Court ruled that because of his actions, he was entitled to claim the ship and its cargo under the maritime version of “finders keepers.” Of course, Gedney did not want the actual physical property; what he wanted was the value of the property in money. Story affirms his right to salvage.