Vladimir Lenin: What Is to Be Done?

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

The full Russian version of What Is to Be Done? runs to about 150 pages arranged in five sections, all of which treat in one way or another the question of how best to organize for a successful Socialist revolution in Russia (as opposed to in other countries). It was written in dialog with other Socialist pamphleteers of the time—that is, with other would-be leaders or spokespersons for working-class movements, both Russian and foreign. Writing in a fairly polemical style, and often naming names, Lenin takes his opponents to task for one or another fault in their basic approach and lays out what he believes is the one proper path forward. The excerpts presented here represent the heart of Lenin's arguments and are drawn from sections 2–4. Sections 1 and 5 deal, respectively, with trends in Marxist criticism and ideas for establishing an all-Russian political newspaper.

II: “The Spontaneity of the Masses and the Consciousness of Social Democracy”

This section proposes and analyzes a critical distinction between two aspects of the overall struggle for worker liberation: “spontaneity” and “consciousness.” Scholars have debated how best to translate and understand these and other key Russian terms—and by extension how best to understand Lenin himself. In general as well as in the context of Lenin's analysis, “spontaneity” connotes actions carried out without forethought or planning—emotional responses, gut reactions, and the like. They are often exhibited by crowds or unorganized groups. The reactions of masses of workers to everyday problems and oppressions are often spontaneous, as in a demonstration, riot, or act of sabotage carried out by workers against their employers and under the influence of anger and raised emotions. “Consciousness,” on the other hand, connotes clarity and purposiveness, and it is accompanied and informed by a proper understanding of the whole structure of forces and circumstances at play. “Conscious” actions are carefully planned and done with a specific, achievable end result in mind. Lenin's twin goals in What Is to Be Done? are to define the two tendencies in all their details, varieties, and ramifications, and then to promote the idea that only through conscious action and proper organization could the goal of worker liberation be achieved. Spontaneity is presented more negatively. At times it is an indispensable but volatile force—something that, when properly controlled and directed, can achieve important results. More often, Lenin views spontaneity as a blind alley and critical weakness in the movement.

“The Beginning of the Spontaneous Upsurge”

Lenin begins with a few examples of “spontaneity” and “consciousness.” He notes that workers' own actions are usually spontaneous, but at the same time he suggests that spontaneous actions can develop eventually into at least the “embryo” of conscious ones. Thus, workers might be expected eventually to achieve a level of consciousness themselves. However, Lenin also seems to reject this thought, stating instead that workers' actions ultimately remain spontaneous. For example, in the last paragraph of this section, Lenin asserts that true social democratic consciousness can be brought to the workers only “from outside”—that is, from dedicated revolutionary intellectuals—and that it can never develop out of workers' own experiences. This ambiguity in Lenin's thinking provides material for those who see him as an elitist and would-be tyrant as well as for those who see him instead as genuine supporter of the interests of the working masses.

In this same section, Lenin makes the first of numerous contrasts between “trade unionist struggles” and “social democratic” ones. Shortly thereafter, he compares “trade union consciousness” with “social democratic consciousness.” In each case, social democratic consciousness is presented as the higher form. Roughly speaking, trade union consciousness corresponds to spontaneous movements. Trade union consciousness focuses on the (spontaneous) short-term economic concerns of workers, such as pay and working conditions. The ultimate purpose of trade unions is to negotiate with—and within—the capitalist system, not to overthrow it. Trade union goals are thus inherently nonrevolutionary. They are also economic, not political. It was Lenin's conviction as a Marxist that true worker liberation required not only the economic adjustments that workers wanted (such as pay raises or shorter hours) but also a worldwide political revolution that would usher in a total transformation of the economic system by abolishing private ownership of the means of production.

Since Lenin viewed most workers as “capable only of working out trade union consciousness,” he identified a compelling need for the input of revolutionary intellectuals. Around 1900 these men and women had typically come not from the working class but, like Lenin, from the property-owning class (the bourgeoisie). Lenin calls these revolutionary intellectuals the “social democrats,” and he sees them as the only bearers of true political consciousness. Without them, the workers remain stuck forever either at trade union consciousness or mere “embryonic” forms of social democratic class consciousness. With them, however, real change is possible, even inevitable. The question remains, however, what is to be the form and organization of the merging of these two elements? Should the revolutionary social democrats lead the workers? Or was this to be a more equal partnership? What would the roles of each be? Lenin returns to these questions throughout What Is to Be Done?

Bowing Down to Spontaneity: Rabochaia mysl’

Rabochaia mysl’, translated as The Workers' Thought, was the name of a radical newspaper of the time, and Lenin critiques its stance in this subsection. Lenin again shoots down any questions about the workers' developing an “independent ideology” for their own liberation. There are, he asserts, only two possible ideologies: bourgeois and Socialist. The first leads to oppression of the workers, the second to their liberation. Any effort by the workers to find their own “middle path” simply plays into the hands of autocracy and the employers. Statements like these have convinced many observers that from the start Lenin was completely dismissive of the workers and ready to use them as a means to his ends; that he was at heart undemocratic, paternalistic, and even dictatorial—characteristics that would later describe the Soviet regime.

Lenin defends himself from these charges at several points. In a lengthy footnote to this section (not reproduced), he argues that the workers can and will play a vital role in their liberation, but not as workers. Rather, he places his hopes on individual members of the working class who—through experience, hard work, and persistent study—will gain a sufficient level of education and themselves become revolutionary intellectuals and true social democrats. He cites as examples the French Socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (a former print worker) and the German Socialist Wilhelm Weitling (a former tailor). Lenin returns to this theme later in the excerpts provided here.

III: “Trade Unionist and Social Democratic Politics”

In this section Lenin again contrasts the two aspects of the workers' struggle. By “economists,” Lenin does not mean what is now commonly understood by the term but rather a group of moderate Marxists, including Russian social democrats then living in exile in Europe. The term economists derives from the group's preference for focusing on precisely those same worker economic demands and concerns that Lenin criticizes as “spontaneous.” Unlike Lenin, the “economists” believed that spontaneous worker action could grow into a genuine revolutionary movement that would sweep away the Russian autocracy and usher in a period of liberal bourgeois capitalism that would itself eventually sow the seeds of Socialist revolution. In comparison with Lenin, the economists generally took a longer-term view of the revolutionary movement and placed greater emphasis on following and supporting, rather than controlling and leading, the spontaneous actions of the workers. Lenin too, like any Marxist, accepted that the coming of Socialism would have to be preceded by a period of capitalism. But to a greater degree than many of his contemporaries, he maintained that capitalism had already taken hold in Russia, and he had already argued that point in detail in The Development of Capitalism in Russia.

Political Agitation and Its Narrowing by the Economists

In this subsection Lenin continues to distinguish between social democracy as he understands it and economism. Economism has a “narrow” viewpoint focused on workers' day-to-day economic struggles, while social democracy assumes a broader and more commanding perspective. Social democracy takes into account the full range and structure of class relations, and it emphasizes the importance of the political struggle against the Russian autocracy. Lenin urges social democrats not to lapse into economism. He calls for specific forms of propaganda and education aimed at opening workers' eyes to the larger issues and ideas of social democracy.

The Working Class as the Vanguard Fighter for Democracy

By calling them the “vanguard,” Lenin emphasizes the critical role the workers themselves will play in their own liberation. But then he restates that the workers cannot develop “class political consciousness” by themselves or from within the sphere of their own economic interests and struggles. They must see their struggle in the much larger context of class relations; that is, from the viewpoint of intellectual Marxists or social democrats.

IV: The Amateurishness of the Economists and the Organization of Revolutionaries

Organization of Workers and Organization of Revolutionaries

In this critically important subsection, Lenin further pursues his division of revolutionary activity into two camps: the conscious “political struggle of social democracy” versus the spontaneous and trade unionist “economic struggle that pits the workers against their bosses and the authorities.” Thereafter, he arrives at the heart of his argument, or at least the part that has attracted the greatest attention. This is the question of how best to organize revolutionary activity.

Lenin makes two points. First, he argues that both camps have an important role to play, although he clearly considers the “political struggle of social democracy” to be the primary one. Second, he argues that because the roles are different, each must be differently organized. Workers' organizations should be “by trade,” “broad,” and “un-conspiratorial,” meaning that they should operate openly. But the organization of revolutionaries, he asserts, must be very different. It must “not be very broad,” and it should be “as secret as possible.” The organization must comprise “first and foremost people who are revolutionary activists by trade”—that is, persons engaged full-time in revolution. Later in the same section and then repeatedly throughout much of the document, Lenin refers to these persons as “professional revolutionaries.” This term has become almost iconic in the literature about Lenin and What Is to Be Done?

“Professional revolutionaries,” as Lenin explains, are more than mere full-time activists. They are also revolutionary intellectuals; they are men and women from any background, including the working masses, who have by experience and study made themselves experts in class theory and Socialist literature. Some scholars have argued that the word and concept of a “professional” does not translate perfectly from Russian to English and that this should be noted particularly in regard to Lenin's famous phrase. In English, the word generally refers to persons engaged in certain fields of work, such as law, medicine, or higher education. In Russian, it can sometimes be used more broadly in the sense of a trade or skill. An alternative translation, “revolutionary by trade,” has recently been offered (Lih, p. 594).

For critics of Lenin and of the Soviet system more generally, the seeds of future tyranny may be found exactly here in Lenin's organizational blueprint for a small, compact, secretive party of “professional revolutionaries”—a party that is closed off to the broad mass of workers and certain of its own status as the correct and politically conscious leader of a wider spontaneous movement. Add to this Lenin's conviction that the spontaneous workers' movement, if left to its own devices, would head into defeat and disaster. In light of Lenin's biases, many of his critics have identified in What Is to Be Done? a formula destined to eventuate in a highly undemocratic system of leaders (the Bolsheviks) and followers (the workers).

Lenin does not see it this way, however. Much of the rest of What Is to Be Done? counters arguments of this sort, which had been leveled at him already from various quarters. In this section he takes on some of these criticisms. In the paragraph beginning “in countries with political freedom,” Lenin argues that while an open party organization might be appropriate in other places, in the autocratic Russia of 1902 it is not. Openness would simply make it easier for the police to infiltrate and break up social democratic circles, dooming the movement to failure. Moreover, unlike the situation in western Europe, in Russia most public expressions of the workers' spontaneous and economic struggles (such as strikes and demonstrations) were illegal, as was also true for “conscious” political revolutionary activity. Thus, the two struggles tended to be easily confused with each other. Lenin maintains they need to be kept separate, both conceptually and organizationally. Leadership by conscious and conspiratorial social democrats is also necessary to thwart the drift into spontaneity, which Lenin asserts would “only be giving the masses over to trade unions of the Zubatov and Ozerov type.”

After restating his convictions about party organization in five short statements of principle, Lenin attends to another criticism: that his plan to concentrate “all conspiratorial functions in the hands of the smallest possible number of professional revolutionaries” will mean that “these few ‘will think for everyone'” and take over the entire movement. Lenin counters that without a stable and professional organization to guide it, the movement will inevitably fail. Moreover, the masses will, in fact, participate more, not less, because the “professional revolutionary” will provide a kind of highly respected role model that ever-increasing numbers of ordinary workers will emulate. He continues, however, to speak of the need for a barrier between the mass movement and the organization of professional social democrats.

“Conspiratorial” Organization and “Democratism”

Lenin here rejects two further criticisms. The first is that the organization he envisions—one that is “powerful and strictly secret” and “concentrates in its hands all the threads of conspiratorial activity” and “is highly centralized”—may ruin the revolution by acting before the masses of workers are sufficiently ready to back them up. The danger, he says, is the reverse. By acting without proper organizational leadership, the working masses themselves risk a devastating loss. He condemns the economists again and also “excitative” terrorists—groups who resort to spontaneous acts of violence and terror intended to bring about revolution before the objective conditions for it were ready.

Lenin then returns to charges that he is being antidemocratic. He expands on his ideas about the unsuitability of open and democratic practices in the context of the autocratic political climate of czarist Russia. How, he asks, can social democrats talk and vote openly, even among themselves, when everything they do is illegal and they must hide their very identities from the czarist authorities?

Local and All-Russian Work

In this subsection Lenin deflects the concern that centralization of social democratic organization will undermine local control and activity and thus place excessive power in the hands of professional revolutionaries. He answers that centralization will instead free up local activists for more productive work and improve the effectiveness of local agitation.