Walter F. White:  “U.S. Department of (White) Justice”

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The Department of Justice in Washington may lay claim to a 100 per cent performance in at least one branch of its activities—the evasion of cases involving burning questions of Negro rights. It sidestepped the issue of the exclusion of Negroes from southern elections on the ground that it was loaded with political dynamite. Other legalistic reasons were later added but the first orders to “Go Slow” were placed on purely political grounds. On the lynching issue the department has set a new record for its ability to dodge from one excuse to another.

On June 6, 1933, a white girl was murdered near Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and shortly thereafter three Negro boys were thrown in jail on suspicion of the murder. On August 12, 1933, the sheriff of Tuscaloosa county unlawfully under color of authority took it upon himself to order their removal from Tuscaloosa to Birmingham “for safekeeping.” The sheriff’s deputies started at night for Birmingham in two automobiles: two deputies and the boys in the leading car, and a car full of deputies trailing behind. The sheriff ordered the convoy to take a back road because, as the deputies later testified, he did not want to risk the convoy being overtaken by a mob on the highway. When the convoy reached the Tuscaloosa county line, the trailing car turned back, leaving the first car with the boys in it to make the rest of the journey alone. Two miles across the county line the car with the boys in it was met, not overtaken, by other cars full of masked men. The boys were taken out, riddled with bullets, and two of them killed. The Southern Association for the Prevention of Lynching made an investigation which found the sheriff culpable.

A delegation made up of representatives from several national organizations on August 24 called at the Department of Justice pursuant to an appointment made with William Stanley, executive assistant to Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, who had promised to receive it in the absence of the attorney general, to request the department to investigate the lynching and prosecute the offending sheriff under Revised Statutes 5510 which makes it a federal offense to deprive an inhabitant of any state of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the federal Constitution under color of law or custom. But although Stanley had made the appointment himself, when the delegation arrived at the department, Stanley was not present, had sent no excuse for his absence, and investigation disclosed that he had not even entered the appointment on his calendar pad.

The delegation was so indignant that the officials of the department four hours later carried them in to see the attorney general himself. The attorney general was suave; he would make no commitment; he called for a brief. Accordingly a thorough brief was filed with the department October 13, 1933, and Stanley stated that he would let the delegation know the decision of the department by November 1. Actually he kept the delegation in suspense until March 5, 1934, although months before both he and the attorney general had told Roger N. Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union that the department did not intend to take any action in the case.

In the meanwhile a bill amending the original Lindbergh kidnaping law of 1932 had been introduced in Congress. The 1932 act had made kidnaping a federal offense where the kidnaped person was knowingly transported in interstate or foreign commerce and “held for ransom or reward.” The amendment to the 1932 act proposed to broaden the scope of federal jurisdiction and make kidnaping a federal offense when the person kidnaped was knowingly transported in interstate or foreign commerce and “held for ransom or reward or otherwise” (italics ours). It also proposed that there should be a prima facie presumption that the person kidnaped had been carried across the state line unless released within three days.

While the bill was before the Senate judiciary committee the attorney general submitted a memorandum to the committee in support of the amendment as follows:

“This amendment adds thereto (to the Lindbergh Act of 1932) the word ‘otherwise’.… The object of the word ‘otherwise’ is to extend the jurisdiction of this act to persons who have been kidnaped and held, not only for reward but for any other reason.

“In addition this bill adds a proviso to the Lindbergh Act that in the absence of the return of the person kidnaped … during a period of three days the presumption arises that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce, but such presumption is not conclusive.

“I believe that this is a sound amendment which will clear up border line cases, justifying federal investigation in most of such cases and assuring the validity of federal prosecution in numerous instances in which such prosecution would be questionable under the present form of this act” (italics ours).

In other words, at this stage the attorney general placed the Department of Justice squarely behind the amendment, giving to its provisions the broadest possible interpretation. But as soon as questions of lynching were raised, the attorney general abandoned his broad construction and began hopping from one position to another to avoid taking jurisdiction.

The bill passed Congress and became enacted into law June 22, 1934, with all the provisions of the amendment adopted except that the time within which a kidnaped person had to be held for presumption of an interstate transportation to arise was increased from three days to seven; and certain other changes not here material.

On October 4, 1934, one Curtis James’ house was broken into near Darien, Georgia, about fifty miles from the Florida line, and James, a Negro, shot and abducted by a mob. In spite of an intensive search he was not found. After waiting more than the seven days provided by the amended Lindbergh law, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People on October 15 wrote the Department of Justice asking whether the abductors of James could not be prosecuted under the amended Lindbergh law. Under date of October 20 the department replied:

“… there is nothing to indicate that the person alleged to have been kidnaped was transported in interstate commerce and was held for ransom, reward or otherwise. In the absence of these facts establishing these elements it would seem that the matter would be one entirely for the authorities of the State of Georgia…”

It is interesting that in the James case the Department of Justice recognized that a lynching case might be covered under the words “or otherwise” of the amended Lindbergh act, but it dodged jurisdiction by repudiating the presumption. In short the department deliberately ignored the fact that not returning James within seven days created a presumption that there had been an interstate kidnaping, and thereby gave the federal government jurisdiction over the crime. It demanded that the N.A.A.C.P. substitute itself for the department’s own Bureau of Investigation and produce the facts establishing an interstate kidnaping.

Then on October 26, 1934, a Negro named Claude Neal was kidnaped from the jail in Brewton, Alabama, by a mob which came to the scene in automobiles bearing Florida licenses. Neal was transported across the Alabama line into Florida, held for fifteen hours and then murdered after unspeakable barbarities near Marianna, Florida. The N.A.A.C.P. felt that at last it had a perfect case for federal prosecution, but before it could even get a letter to the Department of Justice requesting an investigation, the department had issued a public statement that the words “or otherwise” in the amended Lindbergh law did not cover the case of lynching. Faced by the indisputable fact of an interstate kidnaping, the department was forced to the position that the amended Lindbergh law covered kidnaping for purposes of gain, but not for purposes of murder.

With loud fan-fare and carefully staged publicity, on November 7, 1934, the attorney general announced to the country a National Crime Conference called by him in Washington, December 10-13, 1934, “to give broad and practical consideration to the problem of crime” including causes and prevention of crime; investigation; detection and apprehension of crime and criminals. A comprehensive and distinguished list of delegates, including bar associations, was invited; but no Negro associations. On November 9 the N.A.A.C.P. wrote the attorney general asking whether lynching would be placed on the conference agendum. On November 16 the department replied:

“… the program for the conference has not as yet been completed, obviously it will be impossible to cover all the phases of the crime problem in the short space of three days. No definite decision has been made with reference to the subject of lynching. I wish to thank you, however, for bringing this matter to our attention.”

The crime of lynching was not even within the range of the department’s vision.

No word came from the department concerning its decision whether to place lynching on the conference agendum, so on November 22 the N.A.A.C.P. wired the attorney general inquiring whether the decision had been made, and what. The department replied November 27 that “it was not probable that the subject of lynching will be given place on program of Crime Conference.” Repeated efforts were made by local representatives of N.A.A.C.P. to see the Department of Justice in an attempt to obtain a reconsideration of the decision not to place lynching on the agendum, but the department remained unmoved.

Finally on the opening night of the conference when President Roosevelt made his key-note speech and roundly denounced lynching as one of the major crimes confronting this country, another wire was sent the attorney general asking in view of the President’s pronouncement whether he would not at that date place lynching on the agendum. No reply was received the following morning, so at 12:30 P. M. that day the District of Columbia branch of the N.A.A.C.P. began to picket the Crime Conference.

The pickets were arrested almost as soon as they appeared and charged with violation of the District of Columbia sign law and parading without a permit. But that afternoon at 2:25 P. M. the branch received a telegram from the attorney general stating that although there was no room for a discussion of lynching on the formal agendum of the conference, there was a discussion period after each session and that if a discussion period were free, he hoped that the subject of lynching would be taken up on the floor. He further invited a delegation consisting of representatives of the local colored bar association to membership in the conference.

In spite of this action by the attorney general however, the chairman of the conference announced that the discussion period would be limited to the papers read on the formal agendum at the particular session. Under the circumstances the District of Columbia branch of the N.A.A.C.P. decided to resume the picketing.

On the last day of the conference, December 13, just before the morning session adjourned, about sixty pickets suddenly appeared on the sidewalk in front of the convention hall, and silently took up pre-arranged stations about ten feet apart, stretching all the way from the entrance of the hall about three squares along the street the delegates had to use in leaving the conference. To avoid the sign law which prohibited signs twelve inches or over, the pickets carried signs across their breasts eleven inches wide. Ropes were looped around their necks to symbolize lynching. To avoid the charge of parading, each picket remained silent and stationary. The police were taken completely by surprise. To add to the confusion of the police the pickets were provided with a mimeographed sheet of instructions, one of which read that if anybody bothered them they were to call on the police for protection, as the police would not arrest them if they were not violating any law, since to do so would subject the police to an action for damages. The police fumed; an attorney for the Department of Justice hurriedly left to consult the law and find grounds for arresting the pickets, but never returned. That afternoon the conference, smoked out beyond the point of endurance, adopted a completely inane and harmless resolution condemning the use of illegal means in disposing of matters arousing racial antagonisms. The attorney general held both his peace and his hand.

Finally March 12, 1935, a Negro, Ab Young, was lynched near Slayden, Mississippi, allegedly for shooting a white man. Young had been seized in Tennessee, and taken across the line into Mississippi for the ceremonies. Memphis news reporters were on hand either by accident or previous notice.

The N.A.A.C.P. telegraphed both the attorney general and the President of the United States asking for investigation and prosecution under the amended Lindbergh law. To date it is still awaiting a reply. The coroner’s jury returned a verdict that Young had died at the hands of parties unknown.

The attorney general continues his offensive against crime—except crimes involving the deprivation of life and liberty and citizenship to Negroes.

 

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Source: Reprinted courtesy of the Crisis Publishing Co., Inc., the publisher of the magazine of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, material first published in the October 1935 issue of The Crisis.