John Quincy Adams: Diary Entries on the Adams-Onís Treaty

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

When General Andrew Jackson exceeded his orders to patrol the border with Florida by invading the Spanish colony in 1818, condemnation came from many quarters. The Spanish demanded an explanation and apology for Jackson's capture of two garrisons at St. Marks and Pensacola. President Monroe and most of the cabinet were also appalled. Secretary of State Adams, however, not only refused to apologize but additionally saw an opportunity to convince the Spanish that their presence in Florida was untenable. He also initiated a discussion about the vague western border of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase.

In the entry dated February 3, 1819, Adams reports his conversation with Andrew Jackson over an issue that would loom large twenty years later. Significantly, these two future adversaries agreed about the relative importance of Florida and Texas. By accepting the Sabine River (the current border of Louisiana and Texas) and not the Rio Grande (“Rio del Norte” in the diary) as marking the extent of American territory, the United States was conceding its tenuous claim to Texas. Adams and Jackson concurred that acquiring Florida took priority.

In the following weeks Adams used Jean-Guillaume, the baron Hyde de Neuville, the French minister to the United States, as an intermediary between himself and Luis de Onís, the Spanish minister. Rather than claim Texas, Adams vigorously pushed Onís and the Spanish to cede lands north of present-day Texas. Furthermore, Adams wanted to eliminate Spanish claims to the Pacific Northwest. Thus he insisted on “latitude forty-two, from the source of the Arkansas [River] to the South Sea [Pacific Ocean].” At a late stage in the negotiations Onís expressed second thoughts, though Spanish records indicate that he had the authority to make the deal outlined in this entry. Adams's obstinacy was significant for two reasons. First, his unusual demand for the boundary to be at rivers' edges reflected his confidence that American growth would be such that the nation “would have extensive settlements upon them in a very few years.” Second, Adams's European experience told him that Spain could be pushed around. Spain not only was dealing with revolts in its South American colonies but also was weak and had no European allies willing to offer assistance. Spain could not afford to confront a hostile United States at the same time. This insight would likewise be important for the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine.

Adams justly takes pride in the completion of the Adams-Onís Treaty. Although there are indications that Adams could have secured even more territory, he far exceeded the expectations of President Monroe and the cabinet in his negotiations. Clearly the path to the Pacific was a major accomplishment. In his diary twenty-five years later, on September 27, 1844, Adams proudly states, “The Florida Treaty was the most important incident in my life, and the most successful negotiation ever consummated by the Government of this Union” (Memoirs, vol. 12, p. 78).