John Quincy Adams: Diary Entries on the Adams-Onís Treaty

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February 3.—General Jackson came to my house this morning, and I showed him the boundary line which has been offered to the Spanish Minister.… He said there were many individuals who would take exception to our receding so far from the boundary of the Rio del Norte, which we claim, as the Sabine, and the enemies of the Administration would certainly make a handle of it to assail them: but the possession of the Floridas was of so great importance to the southern frontier of the United States, and so essential even to their safety, that the vast majority of the nation would be satisfied with the western boundary as we propose, if we obtain the Floridas.…

February 15.… A more formidable objection was made by Mr. Onis to my third article, containing the boundary line westward of the Mississippi. After a long and violent struggle, he had agreed to take longitude one hundred, from the Red River to the Arkansas, and latitude forty-two, from the source of the Arkansas to the South Sea. But he insisted upon having the middle of all the rivers for the boundary, and not, as I proposed, the western and southern banks; and he also insisted upon the free navigation of the rivers to be common to both nations. De Neuville urged these demands with great earnestness, and thought it was a point of honor which Onis could not abandon without humiliation.

I told him that I could see no humiliation in it. We were to agree upon a boundary, for which purpose the bank of a river was more simple and less liable to occasion future controversy than the middle of the river. It was extremely difficult to ascertain where the middle of a river throughout its course was. It would take a century to settle the middle of the Sabine, Red, and Arkansas Rivers, and to which of the parties every island in them would belong.… It was of no importance to Spain, who never would have any settlements on these rivers. But the United States would have extensive settlements upon them within a very few years.…

He said Onis was exceedingly anxious upon this article, and fearful that he would be blamed in Spain for having sold the Floridas for five millions of dollars. He said there were difficulties to get over in the King’s Council at Madrid as well as in the Senate of the United States. There was an influence of priests in the council, which was always counteracting the policy of the Ministers.…

I rejoined that it was notorious that the Floridas had always been a burden instead of a benefit to Spain; that, so far as her interest was concerned, to obtain five millions of dollars for them would be a bargain for Onis to boast of, instead of being ashamed—as a mere pecuniary bargain, it would be a hard one to us; that as to the priests, if Onis signed the treaty without transcending his powers, it would be too late when it should reach Madrid for them to resist its ratification—and he himself had told me that he had unlimited powers.…

February 22.… The acquisition of the Floridas has long been an object of earnest desire to this country. The acknowledgment of a definite line of boundary to the South Sea forms a great epoch in our history. The first proposal of it in this negotiation was my own, and I trust it is now secured beyond the reach of revocation. It was not even among our claims by the Treaty of Independence with Great Britain. It was not among our pretensions under the purchase of Louisiana—for that gave us only the range of the Mississippi and its waters. I first introduced it in the written proposal of 31st October last, after having discussed verbally both with Onis and De Neuville. It is the only peculiar and appropriate right acquired by this treaty in the event of its ratification.