Nizam al-Mulk: Book of Government; or, Rules for Kings

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

Nizam al-Mulk wrote the Book of Government; or, Rules for Kings in 1091 in order to guide the Seljuk sultans and set a model of government as well as to curb the excesses of the Turkic nomads, generals, and princes. In it, he wrote about the practice and art of governing, the qualities of kingship, and how to handle threats to the Seljuk Empire. In many ways, this work, which became a classic of Islamic political and governmental philosophy, is a memorial to what Nizam al-Mulk failed to accomplish in his lifetime, despite his best efforts.

Chapter X: “Concerning Intelligence Agents and Reporters and Their Importance in Administering the Affairs of the Country”

In this excerpt from the tenth chapter of the book, Nizam al-Mulk stresses that it is important for a sultan to be involved in the matters of state, rather than simply enjoying the comforts and privileges that come with the crown. Here, he is perhaps showing regret for the way in which he treated Malik Shah's early reign, encouraging his leisure pursuits rather than his governance of the empire. Although the actual running of most day-to-day affairs of the state was left to the wazir, a good ruler paid attention to what happened in his kingdom. Nizam al-Mulk also indicates the need for an intelligence network of informants who report back to the ruler. This network took shape in the form of the barid, or the post. Unlike the modern postal service, the barid consisted of riders who dispatched official documents to governors and generals. As they rode throughout the empire, they also were witnesses to how the governors and other officials treated the subjects. Through them, the sultan could be reliably informed about the state of affairs throughout his kingdom—often in contradiction to what his officials told him. In addition, Nizam al-Mulk stresses that the couriers should draw their salary from the treasury. In the modern era this may seem an odd thing to stress, but most officials received their pay from other sources—land grants, endowments, plunder, and rents, none of which were guaranteed. By insisting on payment derived from the treasury, Nizam al-Mulk hoped to ensure adequate payment and ward off temptations to corruption.

Chapter XIII: “On Sending Spies and Using Them for the Good of the Country and the People”

In addition to using the barid as an intelligence network, in chapter XIII, Nizam al-Mulk also recommends the use of spies to thwart government corruption and rebellion as well as the activities of foreign enemies. The recommendation that spies be disguised as merchants and Sufis is particularly noteworthy. Merchants, of course, traveled widely, and it was not uncommon for merchants from Seljuk territories to enter neighboring kingdoms. Sufis, or practitioners of Sufism, a mystical variant of Islam, also traveled widely through the Middle East. They gained access to the homes of local notables and officials because of their piety and the popularity of Sufism, particularly among the Turkic population. Indeed, the Turks converted to Islam primarily through the efforts of the Sufis, although mainstream Sunni religious leaders often did not trust them.

Chapter XVII: “Concerning Boon-Companions and Intimates of the King and the Conduct of Their Affairs”

Nizam al-Mulk places great emphasis on the topic of boon companions. A boon companion was a trusted friend but also a comrade in arms and confidant. In many instances, the friends of the sultan, or any ruler, gained high positions in the government. Because of their relationship with the ruler, they were often above criticism by anyone else. Unless boon companions had good morals and character, their positions might tempt them to abuse their power. This is what Nizam al-Mulk wants to thwart.

It is clear that he sees a division between people with whom the sultan consorts during moments of leisure and those he consults in moments of work. “Where pleasure and entertainment are concerned … it is right that the king should consult with his boon-companions,” he says. But “in everything to do with the country and its cultivation … it is better that he should take counsel with the ministers and nobles of the state and with experienced elders.” In his mind, a clear separation is imperative so that government officials view the ruler as above them and not as an intimate friend. This demarcation stems from traditional Persian views of kingship in which the king is raised above all and is answerable only to God. The elevation of the ruler is contrary to the normal power structure among the Turks and steppe tribes, in which the khan ruled. The khan governed with the advice and cooperation of other tribal leaders. Indeed, ruling the steppe tribes was very much a process of negotiation. Boon companions were crucial to this process, because they provided a support system for the khan—carrying out his orders, leading men into combat, and serving as intermediaries. In Nizam al-Mulk's view, boon companions should not function in this way because it could lead them to be open to corruption.

In a sense, Nizam al-Mulk is discussing not simply how to prevent the diminution of the sultan's authority or corruption. He is also changing the way in which the Seljuks thought of power. He establishes here that the king is the font of authority and does not share it with others. This is not to say that cronyism and nepotism did not occur within the Persian model of rulership, but Nizam al-Mulk sees a clear need for a group of individuals entirely devoted to the king out of personal loyalty, who can defend him against the machinations of corrupt officials and who cannot corrupt the government through the king's favor—thus thwarting cronyism and nepotism.

Chapter XXI: “On Ambassadors and Their Treatment”

In these two paragraphs, Nizam al-Mulk attempts to formalize diplomatic activity. He is clearly disturbed by the lack of protocol that allows ambassadors from foreign powers (presumably the Byzantines) to arrive at the capital unheralded, creating an awkward situation for the ruler. As he explains in the second paragraph, ambassadors also engaged in espionage and gauged troop strengths, wealth, and the condition of the people. As he puts it, “when kings send ambassadors to one another their purpose is not merely the message or the letter which they communicate openly, but secretly they have a hundred other points and objects in view.” During any diplomatic visit, the host would want to create a favorable impression—that the sultan is all-powerful, that he possesses more wealth than his rivals, that his armies are countless, and that his palace and capital are the jewels of the world. Appearances could be everything. If the foreign ambassador were to see a good display, he would give a favorable report of the Seljuks. But if the ambassador were to find the sultan unprepared for his visit, the army in disarray, and no sumptuous gifts ready, then he would report back negatively concerning the affairs of the empire. This knowledge could invite invasion or persuade the ambassador to enlist malcontents seeking to overthrow the sultan.

If, however, the frontier commanders reported the impending arrival of an ambassador to the capital, the sultan could watch and control his movements. The orchestration of the state visit was crucial: It could disguise weakness—including the illness of the sultan—as well as highlight the strengths of the empire. At the end, Nizam al-Mulk alludes briefly to an incident involving himself and Alp Arslan. This is a reference to the fact that, because of intelligence gathered by ambassador spies, Alp Arslan overcame the Byzantines in 1071 at Malazgirt (in eastern Turkey) by exploiting their weaknesses.

Chapter XXIII: “On Settling the Dues of All the Army”

The livelihood of a medieval soldier was always precarious. The troops risked their lives, and their pay was haphazard, in addition to which they often had to buy most of their own equipment. Nizam al-Mulk was a strong proponent of paying troops regularly: two times a year. Twice-yearly payments had been more or less standard practice since the early days of the Abbasids. But the soldiers received large sums of money each time and often spent it all very quickly, then turning to mischief and even rioting in the capital. Should there be insufficient sums to pay the army, the risk was even greater, and sultans and caliphs had been slain in the rioting. Gradually, new methods were used in an attempt to lessen the dangers. The Seljuks adopted the Islamic practice of assigning an iqta‘, or territorial domain of a sort, to troops, who were usually noble-born cavalry. This was not a true land grant. Essentially, taxes or a certain percentage of revenue from an area were assigned to a warrior. The warrior did not necessarily have to dwell there and certainly did not own the land, although sometimes an iqta‘ did become hereditary over time. Those who possessed an iqta‘ are referred to by Nizam al-Mulik as “assignees.” As an additional safeguard against rioting and rebellion Nizam al-Mulk recommends that the soldiers not be paid by mere treasury officials but that they receive their money directly from the hands of the king. When the king paid his soldiers personally, it reminded them whose troops they were. Further, the simple act of having the king put money in their hands gave them access to him on a personal level, strengthening the bonds between warrior and commander. The king thus became much more than a distant figure, if only momentarily.

Chapter XLI: “On Not Giving Two Appointments to One Man; on Giving Posts to the Unemployed and Not Leaving Them Destitute; on Giving Appointments to Men of Orthodox Faith and Good Birth, and Not Employing Men of Perverse Sects and Evil Doctrine, Keeping the Latter at a Distance”

Preventing governmental corruption is a constant theme in Nizam al-Mulk's writing. His major advice is that no single person should hold more than one position and that no two people should share the same position. He is not simply speculating but indeed speaking from thirty years' experience—some of his acquired knowledge learned through his own mistakes. He had seen that some individuals attempted to accumulate positions and thus consolidate power in the court. Typically, in medieval Muslim governments, the bureaucracy was divided into several bureaus, including taxation, the chancellery, the army, and others. By holding several positions, individuals could wield considerable influence and possible carry out their own policies—countering those of the chief wazir or even the sultan. Furthermore, they would be able to acquire enormous wealth, not only from salaries but also from bribes given to them by others in order to gain favor.

Nizam al-Mulk rails against what might be termed “hiring practices.” He is clearly disturbed by the fact that qualified and educated people are unable to secure jobs in the government, whereas those who are unqualified can do so. His words also betray other concerns. By calling someone “unknown,” he is most likely remarking on nepotism—that practice whereby an official's cousin, say, received a job despite lack of experience or qualifications. He also refers to people as “base-born” as opposed to those who have been born “noble.” Nizam al-Mulk came from a noble family and appears to have been displeased by the idea that commoners, whether Persians or Turks, could enter government in this way. Others from his social class had been passed over or given up even seeking government jobs. There are, he says, “well-known, noble, trusted, and experienced men who have no work at all, and are left deprived and excluded.” Thus, the talented and qualified do not work for the government, and the mediocre have risen to the top. Finally, Nizam al-Mulk's statements about Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians (an Iranian monotheistic religion worshipping Ahura Mazda), and Qarmatians (Shia Muslims) should not be surprising. All these groups could practice their religion but they did not serve in the military and were essentially second-class citizens. Nizam al-Mulk was a devout Sunni Muslim who founded a system of religious schools that promulgated the Shafii interpretation of Islamic law. In his opinion, only Muslims (and in his view, only Sunnis were Muslims) should be employed in the government. He sees others as taking jobs away from Muslims.