Press Release Announcing U.S. Recognition of Israel

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

The actual writing and editing of Truman's statement recognizing Israel on May 15, 1948, took place within a specific context inside the American government at that time. The issue of the future of Palestine had been the subject of vigorous debate in the Truman administration, particularly in the periods prior to the United Nations vote in November 1947 to partition Palestine and in May 1948, when the question of the United States' official view of the proposed Jewish state became a matter of intense discussion. It is most likely true that Truman was inclined to recognize Israel all along but was seriously challenged by leading members of his own administration not to do so. The heated politics of the debate also gave him pause as he weighed his decision.

Three groups of people were involved in the debate over U.S. recognition. First, a team of political advisers to Truman, especially Clark Clifford, counsel to the White House and an architect of the president's election campaign effort, and David Niles, a political adviser to Truman and the only American Jew involved in the discussion, argued in favor of American recognition. They were supported by Truman's longtime friend Edward Jacobson; Reform Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, a staunch Republican and leading American Zionist, whom Truman generally did not favor; and Chaim Weizmann, the “old man” of the world Zionist movement and Israel's unofficial ambassador at large to Washington.

On the other side of the table were some of the most powerful voices in the Truman administration. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal argued that American oil interests in the Middle East precluded U.S. recognition of Israel and that the United States was not in a position to place a large number of troops on the ground in Palestine. Forrestal was supported by Secretary of State George Marshall and all of Marshall's top staff, including Loy W. Henderson, head of the Office for Near Eastern and African Affairs, and George Kennan, director of policy planning at the State Department. The State Department group repeatedly attempted to frame the question of Palestine in terms of the unfolding dynamics of the cold war. They argued that the United Nations trusteeship over Palestine, not partition, best met America's regional and global interests.

On March 18, 1948, with the help of Jacobson, Weizmann was invited to the White House to make the case for an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Weizmann's apparent success was contradicted by the startling announcement by the American ambassador to the United Nations, former Vermont Senator Warren Austin, that the United States favored trusteeship, not partition. An embarrassed White House tried to make the case that the ambassador was talking only about a phase in a long-term U.S. policy. The explanation, however, did little to calm the storm that erupted among American Zionists.

The final meeting on the issue of Palestine prior to Truman's recognition of the new Jewish state took place at the White House on May 12, 1948. Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett argued on behalf of trusteeship. Clark Clifford not only presented a case for partition but also suggested, to the great displeasure of Marshall, that the United States should recognize Israel before the proclamation of the state of Israel. For his part, Marshall threatened to vote against Truman in the coming elections if the president following the counsel's advice.

By the morning of May 14, 1948, it was increasingly clear that Truman had decided in favor of partition and would recognize Israel. Marshall called the White House and assured Truman that he would not publicly oppose his commander in chief. Clifford and Lovett met privately to work out a brief statement, which was then transmitted to the President. At 5:51 p.m. the same day, nine minutes before the “State of Israel” was proclaimed in Tel Aviv, Loy Henderson sent a top-secret memo to American embassies and consulates throughout the Middle East anticipating de facto recognition of Israel. For his part, Clifford sent word to the Jewish Agency for Israel, the prestate Israeli government, that recognition was also in the works. However, the United Nations delegation was not informed of the signing, which was about to take place.

At 6:11 p.m. on May 14, 1948, after hand-editing the document Clifford and Lovett had prepared for him, Truman signed and dated the statement of recognition. To make sure that the most current information was included and that his statement was historically accurate, Truman noted that the new government of Israel was still only “provisional” and that the new Jewish state would be called Israel, reflecting the late agreement reached in Tel Aviv. Thus, the United States became the first country in the world to recognize Israel and created the basis for a special relationship between those two sovereign states.

For the Zionist movement, Truman's recognition of Israel was a tremendous validation of its tireless efforts to create a Jewish state in Palestine. For the Arabs, it was part of a series of catastrophes called al-Nakba. This expression refers not only to the loss of land and sovereignty but also to the beginning of a massive refugee problem as large numbers of Palestinians fled from their homes for a variety of reasons when fighting intensified in the spring of 1948 and beyond. A year later, George Marshall resigned from the State Department. He never spoke to Clark Clifford again. Loy Henderson was reassigned to India.