Harry S. Truman: Truman Doctrine

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

President Truman, attempting to follow the reported suggestion of Senator Arthur Vandenberg that he play on the fear of the American people in his address, begins his short congressional address by announcing that the situations in Greece and Turkey are grave and that they directly involve the national security of the United States.

The first half of the speech focuses on the situation in Greece and on the Greek government's request for financial and military assistance. The president bluntly declares that Greece's survival as a democratic nation is dependent on the United States. The dire economic plight of Greece was due to four years of occupation under Nazi Germany, during which crops and fields had been destroyed, inflation had run rampant, and health conditions had deteriorated. Lacking the funds to import goods and services necessary for recovery, the Greek government called on the United States for technological and economic aid so that it might again become a self-sustaining nation. While Truman describes providing this assistance in altruistic terms, fostering economic recovery in Greece would also provide markets for American businesses afraid of another depression.

The president also asserts that political chaos in Greece is hindering economic recovery. Blame for this state of affairs is placed upon a “militant minority, exploiting human want and misery.” This militant minority is, of course, the Greek Communists, who were supported by external forces seeking to exploit Greek unrest. While not mentioning the Soviet Union by name, Truman reports allegations of border violations along Greece's northern frontier, which borders Soviet satellite states of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The small, undermanned Greek army was unable to deal with the insurgency and border violations, which leads Truman to conclude that only the United States is in a position to provide the required military security on which Greek economic recovery is dependent. The president acknowledges that historically Greece has been an area of British influence. Postwar issues of economic reconstruction, however, made it impossible for the British to continue their military support of Greece. In claiming America's unilateral right to replace the British, Truman dismisses the United Nations as a means for providing collective security, simply asserting that the international body is in no position to provide the type of urgent and immediate aid required by the Greek government. Truman apparently believed that a Soviet veto would block Security Council consideration of the Greek situation. Still, the Truman administration, which preferred to go it alone in Greece, did not bring the Greek issue to the United Nations.

Truman provides little detail on the Greek government, although he does concede that the current regime has made mistakes. Observing that the United States condemned violence by both the political Left and Right, he nevertheless argues that it is easier for a democratic government, rather than an authoritarian or Communist government, to correct abuses. The president counters critics of the Greek regime's level of democracy by proclaiming that it represents 85 percent of Greek parliament members chosen in 1946 elections. Military assistance to the Greek government would thus further democracy and limit Communist aggression.

The president includes little concrete information on the Greek political situation, however, which is far more complex than the rhetoric the president employs in his speech might lead one to believe. When the Nazis were driven out of Greece in October 1944, the British had restored to power the exiled monarchist government of Prime Minister George Papandreou. That same month British Prime Minister Churchill journeyed to Moscow, making an agreement with Stalin that recognized Britain's sphere of influence within Greece in exchange for giving the Soviets an upper hand in Romania. Greek Communists, who had played a leading role in resisting the Nazi occupation and forming the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military arm, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), upset this understanding. The British encouraged the EAM to join a coalition government, but the ELAS would not disarm unless returning royalist forces reciprocated. In December 1944 fighting broke out between the ELAS and the royalists. Both sides committed atrocities, and British troops attempted to restore order. At British insistence, parliamentary elections were held in March 1946, but EAM-ELAS boycotted voting. The election led to a Rightist regime under Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris, who increased military pressure against Leftists and recalled King George II—a symbol of oppression to those on the political Left—to the Greek throne.

At this point, the Communists and other factions of the EAM deserted electoral politics and turned to a military strategy of toppling the Greek government. The Democratic army under the leadership of Communist Markos Vafiades was formed, and support was forthcoming from the neighboring Communist nations of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Stalin, however, adhered to his agreement with Churchill, refusing to aid the Greek insurrection. In fact, Stalin did not render assistance to the Greek Communists until June 1947, after the United States authorized the Truman Doctrine and military intervention in support of the Greek government. But Stalin's interest was limited and lukewarm. Fearing Yugoslav independence and dominance in the Balkans, Stalin in October 1948 announced that aid to the Greek rebels was to be terminated. When the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito refused to follow his dictates, Stalin pulled his military advisers from Yugoslavia. The Soviet pressure finally resulted in the July 1949 decision by Tito to close the Greek and Yugoslav border, abandoning support for the Greek insurrection, which ultimately collapsed. A more detailed investigation of the Greek Civil War (1944–1949) fails to buttress the Soviet-inspired rebellion assumed by the Truman Doctrine.

The second part of Truman's speech addresses the needs of the Turkish government, but here the president provides even fewer specifics than in his summary of Greek affairs. Truman acknowledges that Turkey did not suffer from military occupation during the war as Greece had, but the Turks are in desperate need of financial and technical assistance to modernize and maintain their territorial integrity. Truman concludes that bolstering the Turkish government is essential to the “preservation of order in the Middle East.” The president observes that the British are no longer able to extend their financial support of Turkey and that this gap could be filled only by the United States undertaking a larger role in the region. By linking the fates of Greece and Turkey, Truman implies that the collapse of the Greek government could lead to Soviet penetration of the entire Middle East.

This early version of what would later be termed the “domino theory” of Communist expansion is formulated by Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and presidential adviser Clark Clifford. At a February 27, 1944, meeting between the president and congressional leaders, Acheson had vehemently argued that if Greece fell under Soviet influence, the door would be open to Stalin's control of Turkey and Iran. Stalin would not stop with the Middle East—control over Turkey and Greece would provide the opportunity for penetration into Africa and Western Europe. In a rhetorical flourish, Acheson proclaimed that the world faced a choice between American democracy and Soviet dictatorship. The congressional leaders had been impressed with Acheson's arguments, insisting that they be incorporated into a presidential speech. Truman then assigned the drafting of the address to Acheson and Clifford. The grandiose principles that Acheson enunciated were a bit much for Clifford, who suggested that Truman use more practical arguments, such as safeguarding natural resources in places such as the Middle East. This approach would have introduced such economic issues as oil into the conversation. While such considerations were clearly on the minds of policy makers, Truman elected to make the case for American intervention well within the tradition of Wilsonian idealism.

The final section of the Truman Doctrine employs the language of Acheson, calling for Congress and the American people to invest in a crusade against Soviet dictatorship and expansionism. While the Soviet Union and Stalin are not mentioned directly, the focus of Truman's rhetoric remains obvious. The president argues that World War II has taught that efforts to coerce free nations and peoples anywhere are a threat to the United States. Accordingly, the United States must assume a leading role in the formation of the United Nations and collective security, but the president also asserts that he would not hesitate to act unilaterally in an increasingly polarized world.

Truman describes democratic governments as characterized by free elections and individual liberties such as freedom of speech and religion. On the other hand, liberty around the world is threatened by a growing totalitarianism based on terrorism, rigged elections, and control over the press and radio. Truman notes the United States had protested the “coercion and intimidation” used in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria (all within the Soviet sphere of influence) in violation of the Yalta agreements signed by President Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin.

Truman announces that it is incumbent on the United States to ensure that the democratic principles of the United Nations charter are implemented. Employing Acheson's domino-theory argument, Truman insists that if an armed minority is able to impose its will on Greece, then Turkey would be vulnerable, and chaos might spread throughout the Middle East. Furthermore, he maintains that the defeat of democracy in Greece might have serious repercussions for free nations throughout Western Europe. In making his case, Truman relies primarily on democratic rhetoric and eschews more materialistic explanations, such as securing natural resources and markets.

The speech concludes with a request for congressional authorization of $400 million and the dispatching of American civilian and military personnel to supervise reconstruction in Greece. Conscious of Republican efforts to curtail the budgetary requests of the president, Truman attempts a more practical argument that, in some ways, undermines his sense of urgency. Noting that the nation spent over $341 billion in winning World War II, Truman suggests that the price tag to defend Greece and Turkey is relatively cheap. Yet if the world crisis is as dire as the president claims earlier in the address, then it would seem that money should not be a major consideration in the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism.

In a grand finish, however, President Truman brushes aside this inconsistency, returning to his theme that America must embark upon a world crusade to preserve freedom against the forces of darkness constituted by the Soviet Union. Truman argues that the free peoples of the world are looking to the United States to assume the responsibility of protecting global liberty. With the Truman Doctrine, the United States would announce that the nation would use its military and economic power in a struggle for global supremacy against the Soviet Union. The ensuing cold war would rage for the next forty years with wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The United States would emerge triumphant, but the aid for more authoritarian regimes in areas such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, and Nicaragua would also lead some nations to question the legacy of Truman's commitment to free institutions.

Additional Commentary by Tom Lansford, University of Southern Mississippi

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated in the waning days of World War II. Tensions increased after the war when the Soviets refused to withdraw forces from areas of eastern and central Europe. Communist insurgencies, supported by Moscow, threatened pro-U.S. governments in such countries as Greece, Iran, and Turkey. Meanwhile, Great Britain notified the United States that it could no longer serve as the main bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. Consequently, Truman and his advisers crafted a new security policy designed to contain the Soviets. The basis of this policy was laid out by George F. Kennan, deputy head of the U.S. mission in Moscow, in a note that became known as the Long Telegram; in it Kennan argued that the Soviet Union was a direct threat to the economic and political system of the United States and that the country needed to stop the spread of Soviet expansion.

On March 12, 1947, before a joint session of Congress, the president announced what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. In the address, Truman discusses the threats to Greece and Turkey and asks Congress for more than $400 million in aid for the two countries and the authorization to deploy U.S. military advisers to the region. He notes that the United States had received a request from the Greek government for aid and that he did not think that the “American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear” to the Greeks. Truman explains that the principal threat came from Communist insurgents and that the British could no longer support Greece or maintain other commitments in the region. Truman notes that the United Nations was not suited to address the current situation or provide the kind of assistance needed. The president assures Americans that U.S. aid would not come in the form of a blank check and says that the United States had “condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left.” He informs Americans that Turkey also faced threats of possible Soviet aggression (since Turkey bordered the Soviet Union) and needed U.S. economic assistance in the form of military aid and to improve its standard of living.

Truman describes his request as part of the broader framework of U.S. foreign policy. Just as the United States had fought to ensure that people were free from domination by Germany or Japan, Truman argues that the United States had to help countries facing threats from Communism. The president ties U.S. security to the security of other countries. He states that “totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.” Truman also casts the emerging cold war as a struggle between freedom and authoritarianism. One system was marked by open government and individual liberty, and the other was dominated by oppression and tyranny. The president declares firmly “that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Drawing upon points developed by Kennan in his Long Telegram, Truman indicates a desire to avoid direct military conflict. Instead, he argues that the United States should first try to oppose the expansion of totalitarianism through economic support and assistance. He concludes by reminding Congress and the American people that the world looked to the United States for leadership and that global events necessitated a quick response.

The Truman Doctrine was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign and security policy through the cold war. Later presidential doctrines, including that of Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, built directly on the Truman Doctrine. Working with leading Republicans, Truman crafted a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy that remained throughout the cold war. Meanwhile, Truman's address helped secure domestic support for the cold war and U.S. policy initiatives such as the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO.