William McKinley: Message to Congress about Cuban Intervention

Context

The central importance of McKinley's message rests on its role in bringing on the war with Spain in April 1898. That conflict has been one of the most controversial foreign-policy events in American history, because it resulted in an empire in Asia and dominance in the Caribbean. Every phase of the process that led to the war has thus been analyzed in detail. To understand why McKinley's words have become so crucial, therefore, a brief review of the tension with Spain over Cuba is in order.

The United States had long been interested in the future of Cuba during the nineteenth century as the residents of the island chafed under Spanish colonial rule. The problem became acute in 1895 when Cuban rebels initiated an uprising against Madrid. Soon violence raged across the island with a consequent impact on American investments. Efforts to provide arms to rebels from outside Cuba involved the U.S. Navy in Cuban waters. Throughout the United States, citizens read of the fighting in their newspapers and clamored for an end to the cruel and bloody struggle going on ninety miles from the mainland. Some activist politicians believed that the rebellion offered a rationale for annexing Cuba to the United States.

The major issue that divided Madrid and Washington emerged from the outbreak of the uprising. Spain believed that Cuba was part of its larger nation, that it was the last possession of the once-proud Spanish Empire. Americans, on the other hand, identified with the cause of the rebels in Cuba and wanted to see them achieve their independence from Spain. These two goals could not easily be reconciled. In the United States, sensational newspapers, known as the “yellow press” because of a cartoon character called “The Yellow Kid,” advocated a more aggressive posture toward Madrid and Cuba.

The administration of President Grover Cleveland did not sympathize with the rebels' cause. The White House indicated to Spain that it would have to suppress the uprising at some point in the future. There were no deadlines for that political goal, and Cleveland made it clear that Washington would not interfere with Spanish actions. That policy was not very popular within the United States, where partisans of Cuba regarded the administration as pro-Spanish.

The presidential election of 1896 brought William McKinley into office. From the outset of his term, he made it clear that his administration would take a different stance from Cleveland's. Spain must bring the rebellion to an end, by force if possible but preferably through negotiations with the rebels. Any settlement of the conflict would have to be acceptable to the leaders of the rebellion. Since Spain would never grant independence to Cuba through such a process, the actual chances for a peaceful resolution between Washington and Madrid were very small as the McKinley administration began in 1897.

For the first year of the new presidency, the two sides explored their contrasting positions on Cuba. McKinley insisted that in pacifying the rebellion, the Spanish should not use inhumane methods to achieve their ends. The Spanish made some concessions to placate Washington, but the fundamental differences remained at the start of 1898. McKinley's strategy of intensifying diplomatic pressure on Spain to persuade them to yield on Cuba was not working. The first three months of the new year produced an intensification of the crisis. Spain had granted Cuba some degree of autonomy in its domestic affairs in late 1897. Pro-Spanish crowds rioted in Havana against these changes in mid-January. Then, in early February, the Cuban rebels released a letter they had intercepted from the Spanish minister in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme. In it, he criticized McKinley as “weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd.” More important, he also indicated that the Spanish were stalling for time in the hope that American opinion might shift in their direction.

The battleship Maine had been sent to Havana in January on a goodwill mission. On February 15 it exploded, killing its 265 men. A wave of outrage swept the United States amid charges that the Spanish were responsible for the event. Modern research indicates that an internal explosion was the cause, but that was not known at the time. The disaster produced a naval inquiry about the cause of the explosion. If that panel reported that Spain was responsible, President McKinley would face great pressure from Congress to intervene in Cuba. His strategy of pressuring Spain to agree to a negotiated withdrawal from Cuba would then meet its most difficult test.

On March 19 the president learned that the naval panel was going to blame an external cause for the loss of the Maine. The president warned Madrid that a crisis was coming. At the end of the month the United States asked Madrid if it would accept an armistice and negotiations with the insurgent forces. The end of that process, though Washington did not say so, was independence for Cuba. By March 31 Spain gave its answer. It would not negotiate. On April 6, the president prepared to send a message to Congress asking for the authority to intervene. Over the next five days, efforts went forward to avert war. Spain offered to cease hostilities, a move that did not involve official recognition of the rebellion. How long this military pause would last would be up to the Spanish commander in Cuba. There were other minor concessions, but on the essential point, future independence for Cuba, the Spanish were unwavering. Their final answer was negative. At that point, McKinley submitted his message to Congress.