William McKinley: Message to Congress about Cuban Intervention

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

In the first two paragraphs, McKinley invokes the Constitution as his reason for reporting to Congress on the Cuban crisis with his recommendations about what needed to be done. He adds that the issue of what to do in Cuba has an “intimate connection” to the United States. Therefore, the president must decide how dealing with Cuba accords with the precepts of traditional American foreign policy.

McKinley notes in the third paragraph that the Cuban Revolution is part of a process of unrest and revolt on the island that has been going on for fifty years, with disturbing effects on commerce. More important for the president, the Spanish have engaged in “the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare” that have “shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.”

Paragraphs 4 through 6 outline what had happened in Cuba following the start of the revolution in February 1895. McKinley comments that the uprising and the effort to suppress it have produced a conflict in which “a dependent people striving to be free have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state.” The president outlines the effects on Cuba and the United States. The agitation over Cuba has sparked a “perilous unrest among our own citizens” and called into question the principle of “the avoidance of all foreign entanglements.”

In the seventh paragraph, McKinley describes the Cleveland administration's policies regarding Cuba. He indicates that the goal was “an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain.” The sticking point was Spain's refusal to negotiate unless the insurgents accepted Madrid's terms and submitted to Spanish rule.

In the ninth paragraph the president explains what his administration has done since March 1897. The Spanish policy to which he refers is called “reconcentration.” To dry up support for the rebellion, Cubans were relocated to camps where Spanish troops could control them. In his diplomatic messages, McKinley had urged the Spanish to seek a peaceful settlement acceptable to the rebels. The change of government in Spain in mid-1897 offered another chance for a resolution of the crisis.

As he states in the tenth paragraph, McKinley believed that neither side in Cuba could achieve a complete victory. The two parties would fight until both were exhausted, as had happened in the 1870s in “the truce of Zanjon.” That outcome was unacceptable to “the civilized world” and especially to the United States. The president's narrative in the eleventh paragraph moves ahead to March 27, when he submitted proposals to Madrid hoping for an armistice and peace negotiations with McKinley as the mediator. The United States, as McKinley notes in the twelfth paragraph, also sought an end to the reconcentration policy and the sending of relief supplies to Cuba from America.

According to the thirteenth paragraph of McKinley's message, the Spanish reply came back on March 31 (“ultimo” in this context meaning “the preceding month”), and it represented a rejection of McKinley's initiative. First, the Cuban parliament would have to be considered, with the central government in Madrid having the final word. The Spanish would stop hostilities if the insurgents asked for a cessation. The president notes that the length of such a pause in the fighting would be up to the Spanish military commander on the ground.

In the fourteenth paragraph, McKinley mentions how the negotiations between the American minister to Spain (General Stewart Woodford) and the government in Madrid have been conducted. From these conversations, McKinley knew that the Spanish would allow the Cuban parliament to reach a settlement with the rebels under the conditions that Madrid specified. As the president observes in the next brief paragraph, “with this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his effort.” What then should the United States do? In the sixteenth paragraph McKinley explores the United States' options in dealing with Cuba based on what he had told Congress in December 1897. At that time, he had rejected annexation of Cuba as “criminal aggression.” Instead, McKinley outlines four alternatives in the ensuing paragraphs—to recognize the rebels as belligerents, to recognize Cuban independence, to encourage “a rational compromise” between the two parties, and, finally, to intervene in favor of one side or the other.

In paragraphs 17 through 20, McKinley presents the United States' options. Recognizing the Cubans as belligerents would bring on war with Spain but would leave the United States unable to intervene effectively. He does not favor recognition of the Cuban belligerents or a statement in favor of Cuban independence. In the latter case, as he notes in paragraph 20, the designation of “any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized.” The United States could do that at some later date, as he indicates in paragraph 21.

Having disposed of these alternatives, McKinley then says that the United States can intervene either as a neutral or the ally of the Cuban rebels. Despite the president's language in paragraph 22 about becoming “the active ally of the one party or the other,” no one in the United States would have thought of intervening on the side of Spain. In paragraph 24, McKinley comes down on the side of acting “as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity.” In the next six paragraphs, McKinley lays out the reasons that would justify American intervention in Cuba. He cites the “cause of humanity” because of the bloodshed on the island. “It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.” In paragraph 27, he points out that the obligations the United States has toward the people of Cuba make it necessary to step in to provide legal protection that the Spanish cannot afford them. In paragraph 28, he alludes to the destruction of American property in Cuba.

Paragraph 29 provides the main ground for McKinley's argument to Congress for intervention. “The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense.” In paragraphs 30–32, the president discusses the sinking of the Maine and the conclusion of the navy's court of inquiry that an external explosion caused the disaster. Note that McKinley does not blame Spain for the event, but he does say that Madrid could not assure the safety of the vessel in Havana Harbor. In paragraph 33, McKinley concludes that Spain cannot repress the rebellion and that “the enforced pacification of Cuba” is the only option. Then he comes to his conclusion about the situation. “In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.”

McKinley then turns to what he would like Congress to do. Rather than asking directly for war with Spain, he seeks authorization to end hostilities between the Spanish and the Cubans, to secure a stable government on the island “capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations” as well as providing peace and security, and to use the American military toward these ends. After mentioning the need to provide relief supplies in paragraph 35, the president asks Congress for action. In paragraph 36, he refers to Spain's offer to proclaim “a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me.” The final paragraph leaves open the possibility that this last-minute move might help the situation. McKinley does not discuss the conditions of this pause in the fighting, even though Congress and the White House knew this was important. The Spanish action did not recognize the belligerency of the Cuban rebels, the Spanish commander would determine how long the suspension lasted, and in essence to Washington it seemed that once again Spain was stalling for time.